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is  my  own.  Where  information  has  been  derived  from  other  sources,  I 
confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 
 
Abstract 
 
In this thesis I examine the role of personal and interpersonal responsibility 
in relational egalitarianism and argue that Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism 
should be understood as a means by which to realise this aspect of justice, 
rather than as a competing and incompatible comprehensive theory. I hope 
to show that resource egalitarianism neutralises the effects of brute luck, not 
merely so as to put “cosmic injustices” to rights, but to ensure, insofar as 
possible, that individuals can relate to one another on equitable terms by 
taking  responsibility  for  the  effects  of  their  actions.  I  focus  especially  on 
Elizabeth  Anderson’s  criticisms  of  responsibility-catering  distributive 
theories and attempt to demonstrate how the interpersonal conception of 
justification  she  identifies  as  the  central  feature  of  relational  egalitarian 
theories underlies Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance mechanism.  
 
I argue that the distinction Dworkin draws between brute and option luck 
depends on a highly contextual conception of what it is reasonable to expect 
of one another under various circumstances, informed by the capabilities one 
cannot  reasonably  be  expected  to  give  up  or  risk  losing.  I  draw  out  the 
relational egalitarian motivation of Dworkin’s True-Cost Principle and argue 
that these true costs cannot be identified without an appreciation for the 
social  construction  of  the  ‘dominant  cooperative  scheme’  and  a  similar 
concern for the benefits to the community of individual choices. This sets the 
terms for our reconception of hypothetical insurance as a mechanism, not 
only for neutralising brute luck beyond the reach of voluntary insurance, but 
of correctly allocating the diffuse costs and benefits of agents’ choices and 
behaviours.    3 
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Introduction 
 
Much  contemporary  public  discourse  regarding  domestic  poverty  and 
disadvantage focuses on the responsibility of the individual for his own well-
being. This concern is today probably most apparent in the realm of work 
and unemployment. In the UK, welfare reform is couched in terms of the duty 
to “make work pay”, rewarding “strivers” and disincentivising the “skiver” 
lifestyle. The intuition is that society has no duty to support those who can, 
but choose not to, support themselves or contribute to the communal pot. Yet 
both  what  “choosing”  not  to  contribute  means,  and  what  counts  as  a 
contribution in the first place, is subject to much disagreement. Most seem to 
agree,  however,  that  the  present  system  fails  to  conform  to  a  reasonable 
interpretation of either.  
 
The current system is plainly deficient in its criteria for choice under various 
conditions  -  for  example  those  of  ill-health  and  disability.  Much  recent 
controversy has surrounded the Department for Work and Pensions’ Work 
Capability Assessments, as carried out by the independent contractor ATOS. 
Obvious, headline-grabbing mistakes include the cuts of benefits to comatose 
individuals,  but  horror-stories  abound  of  disabled,  terminally-ill  and 
mentally unwell persons being deemed fit for work, with the implication that 
they have merely been “work-shy" "scroungers" "trying it on to get sickness 
benefit"
1,  choosing  idleness  over  contribution.  The  continually  high 
proportion of successful appeals against these decisions seems to  show that 
the  line  between  wilful  idleness  and  genuine  disability  has  been 
inappropriately drawn in these assessments.  
 
The  system  also  displays  shortcomings  in  its  implied  definition  of 
contribution. Care work, particularly, is widely undervalued despite  its vital 
social and economic role. My interest here is partly motivated by a concern 
for the gendered nature of poverty worldwide and domestically. Women are 
                                                 
1 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/23/government-reform-disability-benefits   5 
disproportionately  poorer  due  to  their  continuing  status  as  primary 
caregivers, both for offspring and other relatives. A persistent weakness of 
distributive  justice  discourse  highlighted  by  feminist  theorists  specifically 
has been its tendency to idealise away from these highly socially connected 
actors, in favour of “the myth of independent moral agents who are not born, 
do  not  develop  under  the  care  of  their  parents,  never  get  sick,  are  not 
disabled and do not grow old.”2 It’s no surprise that these agents have been 
the  focus  of  analysis  thus  far  since  they  are  seemingly  much  more 
straightforward to deal with. It is also generally understood that theories and 
models in a variety of disciplines have tended to take a specific type of male 
actor as the norm, treating deviations as anomalies to be dealt with “post-
theory.” However, as Sen claims upon introducing his capabilities approach, 
“human  diversity  is  no  secondary  complication  (to  be  ignored,  or  to  be 
introduced ‘later on’); it is a fundamental aspect of our interest in equality.”3 
One of my aims, then, is to identify the elements of human diversity from 
which  we  cannot  abstract  away  in  order  to  develop  a  useful  theory  of 
distributive justice.  
 
Luck and Resource Egalitarianism 
 
The fable of the ant and the grasshopper is often used to illustrate the appeal 
of  luck  egalitarianism  over  strict  equality.  While  all  egalitarian  theories 
articulate in some way a belief in the equal moral worth of persons, there is a 
strong natural intuition that it would be unfair, even exploitative, for some to 
benefit from the labour of others simply because they choose not to work. 
Some may be truly unable to contribute for reasons beyond their control, and 
this  is  regrettable,  but  one  who  merely  pleases  himself  is  understood  to 
choose  to  do  so,  and  is  therefore  held  to  be  an  appropriate  target  of 
condemnation. G. A. Cohen lauds Ronald Dworkin for introducing this new 
school of theories of distributive justice sensitive to the justice-relevance of 
                                                 
2 Brown (2009), p68 
3 Sen, (1992), xi   6 
personal  responsibility,  observing  that  he  thereby    “performed  for 
egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating within it the most 
powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice 
and responsibility.”4  
 
In less austere terms, the luck egalitarian intuition can be described as an 
inherently liberal approach to distributive justice since it centres respect for 
the personal preferences and values of individuals: some may have expensive 
tastes and will be happy to work harder than others for these tastes to be 
fulfilled, others will have a preference for leisure and simple pleasures. Strict 
equality is undesirable due, in part, to its lack of respect for the different 
values and goals of different persons. It is therefore a natural first step away 
from this simple and unnuanced dictate of an egalitarian ethos to attempt to 
devise  a  system  that  takes  those  different  values  and  goals  into  account, 
while retaining the underpinning egalitarian thrust. 
 
If  the  importance  of  personal  responsibility  is  one  tenet  of  luck 
egalitarianism, the other is the moral irrelevance of brute luck. Brute luck is 
understood to pick out those effects of chance over which we have no control, 
which are not subject to personal responsibility. It is thus understood that, to 
the extent that these effects carry costs, they should be borne by the whole 
community  (where  possible)  in  the  interest of  fairness,  so  that  no  one  is 
arbitrarily  disadvantaged.  Whether  the  impacts  of  brute  luck  genuinely 
constitute a justice concern, however, is at least one crux of the disagreement 
between relational and luck egalitarians.  
 
In order for a luck egalitarian approach to work, however, we must furnish “a 
defensible account of genuine choice.”5 I will specifically utilise Dworkin’s 
resource  egalitarianism  in  refining  such an account.  Dworkin’s  distinction 
between  brute  luck,  which  is  appropriately  neutralized,  and  option  luck, 
which appropriately influences resource distribution, is especially intuitive 
                                                 
4 Cohen (1989), p933 
5 Kaufman (2004) p819   7 
when the line between the two is understood to vary contextually according 
to prevailing reasonableness judgments, I will argue. Various theorists placed 
under the ‘luck egalitarian’ banner, however, disagree on the character of the 
distinction.  Cohen  can  perhaps  be  understood  as  the  most  in  favour  of  a 
circumspect  ring  around  admissible  cases  of  option  luck,  leaving  many 
individual variations in taste, etc. as part of that set subject to equalisation. 
Richard Arneson and Eric Rakowski propose a much wider scope for option 
luck, leaving much more of a person’s fate up to their own tastes, ambitions, 
personal characteristics, etc. And Dworkin, I propose, advocates something of 
a middle ground in this regard.  
 
In fact, Dworkin rejects the label ‘luck egalitarian’ (coined by Anderson) for 
his  theory  as  a  misnomer.  In  ‘Sovereign  Virtue  Revisited’  he  claims  that 
‘equality  of  fortune’  or  ‘luck  equality’  suggests  the  impacts  of  chance  on 
individuals’  outcomes  are  to  be  equalised  altogether,  after  the  die  roll. 
Instead he calls his approach ‘equality of resources’ and emphasises that its 
aim is “to make people equal, so far as this is possible, in the resources with 
which  they  face  uncertainty.”6  It  is  this  commitment  to  defending  the 
legitimate  operation  of  chance  that  renders  the  distinction  he  proposes 
between option luck and brute luck so important.  
 
Perhaps the best definition of equality of resources Dworkin offers is of: 
 
“[…]a  process  of  coordinated  decisions  in  which  people  who  take 
responsibility for their own ambitions and projects, and who accept, 
as part of that responsibility, that they belong to a community of equal 
concern, are able to identify the true costs of their own plans to other 
people, and so design and redesign these plans so as to use only their 
fair share of resources in principle available to all.”7 
 
Giving choice such a central role in our distributive scheme creates an urgent 
requirement for a robust conception of genuine personal responsibility. This 
potentially  “lands  political  philosophy  in  the  morass  of  the  free  will 
                                                 
6 Dworkin (2002), p107 
7 Dworkin, (2000), p122   8 
problem,”8  (a  hard  determinist  would  surely  take  Dworkin’s  theory  to 
collapse  into  strict  equality  in  the  belief  that  choice  and  personal 
responsibility are ultimately illusory), but for now we will focus on the most 
plausible common-sense accounts of choice  available, at least until a final 
verdict on the determinism question emerges. The following chapter, then, 
will  identify  reasonable  knowledge  of  risks  and  reasonable  alternative 
options  as  key  variables  in  the  attribution  of  personal  responsibility  for 
outcomes.  
 
One  vital  aspect  of  this  account  will  be  the  role  of  risk  to  fundamental 
capabilities in agents’ deliberations as to how to invest their limited time and 
resources. Wolff and de-Shalit identify a sense in which a choice is ‘forced’ 
when “the agents can choose to take or avoid a risk, but not taking it would 
typically confront them with a greater risk, or the certainty of some harm.”9 
For example, when taken individually, the choice to put off having children 
until one is financially stable and the choice to conceive and raise children 
while living in social housing seem to be free decisions whose consequences 
are appropriately regarded as matters of personal responsibility. One might 
be held partially responsible for health complications as a result of a later 
pregnancy given that one could have chosen to have children earlier in life. 
On the other hand, one might be held responsible for one’s children’s lower 
educational  achievements  and  anti-social  behaviour  given  that  one  could 
have chosen to postpone starting a family until one could afford to live in a 
more  advantaged  area  and  to  take  time  out  of  one’s  career  to  parent 
personally. However to find yourself in a position where you must choose 
either the first set of risks or the second undermines the notion that you are 
thereby responsible for the outcomes to the same extent.  
 
Of  course,  the  mere  fact  that  in  pursuing  one  line  of  action  one  thereby 
forgoes another cannot be enough to render the choice forced and absolve 
the agent of responsibility for its outcomes. If I go camping for the weekend 
                                                 
8 Cohen (1989), p934 
9 Wolff and de-Shalit (2007), p67   9 
and thereby fail to complete, or run the risk of failing to complete, a piece of 
coursework, it is no excuse to say that if I had chosen otherwise and stayed at 
home to complete the coursework I would have thereby missed out on an 
enjoyable weekend. There are certain risks or losses which intuitively carry 
greater  implications  for  personal  responsibility  than  others.  Alexander 
Brown notes that “[Luck egalitarianism] stipulates that people should bear 
the costs of their choices wherever possible, but it is a further question which 
choices they should be held responsible for and the answer to this question 
depends in part on [...] ensuring that people have effective access to valued 
functionings.”10  A  recurring  theme  throughout  this  thesis  will  be  the 
proposition that the capabilities approach offers a good guide to what these 
valued  functionings  might  be.  I  will  ultimately  claim  that,  in  pursuit  of  a 
system  under  which  differences  in  distributive  outcomes  simply  reflect 
differences  in  individuals’  preferences  and  values,  it  is  necessary  that  we 
guarantee  all  genuine  access  to  a  certain  basic  set  of  capabilities.  This 
approach will find parallels in Anderson’s work,11 yet rather than judging 
arrangements based on the extent to which they foster democratic inclusion, 
I  will  recommend  evaluation  based  on  the  extent  to  which  brute  luck  is 
neutralised,  allowing  genuine  choices  to  determine  distributions,  thereby 
fostering relational equality.  
 
The Capabilities Approach 
 
Now  might  be  the  best  time  to  introduce  my  belief  that  the  capabilities 
approach  and  resource  egalitarianism  are  highly  compatible,  and  that 
capabilities can offer more to resource egalitarianism than Dworkin allows. 
Both  resource  egalitarianism  and  the  capabilities  approach  attempt  to 
account for the way in which internal, personal features vary from person to 
person and impact the outcomes that are available to individuals, even when 
they  have  precisely  equal  external  resources  at  their  disposal.  Dworkin’s 
                                                 
10 Brown (2005), p318 
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solution is to treat these internal features as resources subject to equality 
themselves, claiming that “[s]omeone who is born with a serious handicap 
faces  his  life  with  what  we  concede  to  be  fewer  resources,  just  on  that 
account,  than  others  do.”12  His  hypothetical  insurance  scheme  then 
compensates  with  extra  external  resources  those  who  find  themselves 
lacking in particular internal resources.  
 
The  question  then  becomes  how  to  determine  the  appropriate  level  of 
compensation. We might ask what the ‘conversion rate’ is between internal 
and  external  resources,  or  how  to  set  one.  Dworkin  implicitly  appeals  to 
capabilities in his answer to this question arguing that, if individuals were 
able to choose the type of insurance to buy against, for instance, congenital 
disabilities, they would do so to the extent that compensation might help to 
achieve some or all of the capabilities compromised by that disability. Indeed 
Dworkin  ties  the  value  of  insurance  against  certain  disabilities  for  an 
individual  to  the  value  that  individual  would  place  on  the  threatened 
capability  or  capabilities,13  and explains how the  premium one would be 
willing to pay for such insurance depends additionally on the availability of 
medical  technology  to  restore  the  affected  capability. 14  Since  individual 
insurance decisions are simply impossible in these cases assumptions have to 
be made regarding the decisions most people would likely make if they could 
choose for themselves. Here, then, we find a crucial role for the work that has 
been  done  within  the  capabilities  literature  attempting  to  identify  the 
fundamental  capabilities  we  all  (or  almost  all)  value  enough  to  justify  a 
“compulsory process [...] designed to match the fund that would have been 
provided  through  premiums  if  the  odds  [of  suffering  such  handicap]  had 
been equal.”15 
 
While Dworkin treats one’s internal features as themselves resources subject 
to equality, the capabilities approach utilises instead the notion of ‘personal 
                                                 
12 Dworkin, (2000), p81 
13 Dworkin, (2000), p78 
14 Dworkin, (2000), p79 
15 Dworkin, (2000), p78   11 
conversion  factors’  -  the  idea  that  an  individual’s  internal  features 
contingently impact the ease with which they can transform their external 
resources into ‘beings and doings’. Sen explains that:  
 
“[t]he  extent  of  real  inequality  of  opportunities  that  people  face 
cannot be readily deduced from the magnitude of incomes, since what 
we can or cannot do, can or cannot achieve, do not depend just on our 
incomes but also on the variety of physical and social characteristics 
that affect our lives and makes us what we are.”16   
 
Resource egalitarianism can be understood as focusing attention on personal 
conversion factors and the issue of how personal responsibility and internal 
features  should  relate  through  insurance.  This  focus  is  motivated  by  the 
moral  arbitrariness  of  internal  features  that do  not  stem  from  one’s  own 
choices.  
 
Crucially,  however,  Dworkin  does  not  treat  the  role  of  other’s  tastes  and 
ambitions as morally arbitrary, even though this is another factor beyond any 
one  individual’s  control.  He  states  that  “[t]he  mix  of  personal  ambitions, 
attitudes,  and  preferences  that  I  find  in  my  community[...]  is  not  in  itself 
either fair or unfair to me; on the contrary, that mix is among the facts that fix 
what it is fair or unfair for me to do or to have.”17 Dworkin is concerned to 
ensure that we appreciate the true costs of our choices to others, and it is 
therefore vital to resource egalitarianism that the preferences of others are 
allowed  to  impact  on  our  capabilities  and  outcomes.  In  this  way  the 
preferences of others are treated implicitly as akin to brute facts about the 
world, to which individuals must mold themselves.  
 
A central question throughout this thesis, however, will be how we might 
distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate impacts of others’ tastes 
and preferences on one’s capabilities. Social conversion factors, according to 
Pierik  and  Robeyns,  are  the  factors  affecting  what  one  can  do  with  the 
resources one has due to “characteristics of the society in which one lives, 
                                                 
16 Sen (1992), p28 
17 Dworkin (2000), p298   12 
such a social norms, discriminating practices, societal hierarchies, gender and 
racial norms,  infrastructure, public  goods and social  structures  that  affect 
different  categories  of  persons  differently.”18  Dworkin  arguably  sets  such 
complications aside explicitly, describing the society in which he refines his 
theory as one that “has no history of subordination [...] or any other historical 
process  that  has  unlevelled  the  playing  field  in  our  actual  plural  and 
multicultural societies.”19 Accordingly the ways in which other agents shape 
the extent to which one can convert resources into capabilities are taken to 
be fair reflections of the real costs of one’s actions, by hypothesis.  
 
Yet Dworkin does, in his chapter on liberty, describe a number of principles 
according  to  which  the  auction  must  be  modified  in  order  to  correct  for 
various distorting factors - that resources be auctioned in as abstract a form 
as  possible,  that  security  of  use  of  those  resources  be  ensured,  that 
externalities  be  accounted  for,  that  citizens’  preferences  be  authentically 
developed.20  The final principle he posits is that of independence, which 
specifically corrects for the  unjust ways in which others’ preferences may 
impact  an  individual’s  capabilities.  This  principle  requires  that  baseline 
constraints on the auction be put in place “to protect people who are the 
objects  of  systematic  prejudice  from  suffering  any  serious  or  pervasive 
disadvantage from that prejudice.”21 Dworkin has not completely abstracted 
away from social conversion factors, then, but his treatment is simplistic and 
inadequate. This is reflected in his subsuming such issues under the category 
of personal resources, or personal conversion factors. While he accepts that 
social or structural change is preferable to compensation in these cases, he 
describes the issue of prejudice as a facet of equality of resources’ response 
to  the  problem  of  handicaps,  since  one  can  understand  victims  of  both 
handicaps and prejudice as disadvantaged due to the tastes of others. It is at 
this  point  I  believe  the  approach  of  ‘justice  as  recognition’  reveals  its 
relevance to resource egalitarianism. 
                                                 
18 Pierik and Robeyns, p136 
19 Pierik and Robeyns, p141 
20 Dworkin (2000), pp147-161 
21 Dworkin (2000), p161   13 
Social Conversion Factors and Justice as Recognition 
 
In  Justice  and  the  Politics  of  Difference  Iris  Marion  Young  challenged  the 
dominant understanding of justice as merely an issue of distribution, arguing 
that  this  tends  to  ideologically  entrench  certain  assumptions  regarding 
human nature, the primary subjects of politics, etc. This type of thought has 
given rise to a separate sphere of justice theorising - the concept of justice as 
recognition.  Recognition  identifies  a  distinct  aspect  of  justice  concerned 
specifically with the cultural sphere. While distributive justice deals with the 
allocation of benefits and burdens amongst citizens, recognition confronts 
issues related to social respect and esteem. Recognition is often dismissed as 
being of little relevance to distributive justice. It has been equated largely 
with ‘identity politics’ movements, which demand equal respect and cultural 
representation  for  marginalised  groups  -  people  of  colour,  women,  LGBT 
persons, those with disabilities, etc. While this “cultural” side of justice is 
widely  understood  to  be  important  in  terms  of  interpersonal-  and  self-
respect, it is often treated as a separate sphere of justice to that which deals 
with the distribution of resources. Yet though recognition is not reducible to 
its distributive counterpart there is a huge degree of overlap between the 
two  spheres,  and  justice  as  recognition  can  be  affirmed  or  violated  both 
through  a  given  distributive  scheme’s  permitted  consequences  and  its 
expressive attitudes. 
 
Nancy Fraser describes recognition as aiming at a more “difference-friendly 
world,  where  assimilation  to  majority  or  dominant  cultural  norms  is  no 
longer  the  price  of  equal  respect.”22  The  point  of  much  of  her  work  on 
recognition and redistribution has been that, as things stand, assimilation is 
not only the price of equal respect but of equal economic opportunity, even of 
subsistence.  This  is  not  the  mere  claim  that  issues  of  recognition  and 
misrecognition  can  spill  over  into  the  (otherwise  inherently  impartial) 
economic  realm  through  the  prejudices  of  employers,  or  through  the 
                                                 
22 Fraser, Redistribution or Recognition, p7   14 
economic impact of the emotional hardship engendered by misrecognition. It 
is  the  deeper  claim  that  the  economic  system  itself  presupposes  the 
universality of dominant group features and enforces these as norms. This 
can  be  seen  in  the  labour-market  assumption  that  workers  are  not  also 
primary caregivers with the attendant responsibilities,23 that there is a sharp 
distinction between healthy workers and disabled dependents, 24  and that 
respectability and a certain culture go hand -in-hand.25 The “cultural norms 
that  are  biased  against  some  are  institutionalised  in  the  state  and  the 
economy; meanwhile, economic disadvantage impedes equal participation in 
the making of culture, in public spheres and in everyday life. The result is 
often a vicious cycle of cultural and economic subordination.”26 Particularly 
important for this thesis is the consequent point that theorists of distribution 
are not immune to this diversity-blindness either. Economic approaches to 
choice  and  distributive  justice  theories  have  often  assumed  agents  to  be 
broadly similar to the theorist himself - able-bodied and minded, male, not a 
primary care-giver, relatively wealthy, etc.  
 
There are a number of issues with Dworkin’s account from the perspective of 
justice as  recognition: it arguably fails to  “detect  injustices in  the  current 
gender division of labour and care”27 and the view of disability on which it 
relies runs contrary to that put forward by many modern disability theorists. 
Nevertheless  I  will  defend  an  interpretation  of  Dworkin’s  theory  against 
certain  prominent  recognition  criticisms,  particularly  those  of  Anderson, 
before  delving  specifically  into  the  positive  reasons  I  believe  it  can  and 
should be (re)interpreted in a way that takes account of these insights. While 
resource egalitarianism is a thoroughly distributive approach to justice, it 
does go further than other prominent egalitarian theories in incorporating 
real diversity from the start through its concern for ‘personal resources’. In 
this way it has strong affinities with the capabilities approach which similarly 
                                                 
23 Fraser, Justice Interruptus, p42 
24 Groering, “Mental Illness” and Justice as Recognition, p18 
25http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/10671048/Working-class-children-must-learn-to-
be-middle-class-to-get-on-in-life-government-advisor-says.html 
26 Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition?, p72-3 
27 Robeyns, Is Nancy Fraser’s Critique of Theories of Distributive Justice Justified?, p541   15 
eschews a ‘standard’ agent to which we are compared and found wanting.  
 
To  ensure  resource  egalitarianism  coheres  with  the  insights  of  justice  as 
recognition, I argue, the  conditions  of responsibility on  which the  option-
luck/brute-luck  distinction  relies  must  take  into  account  inequalities 
generated through certain of the social conversion factors mentioned above. 
While  prejudice  and  discrimination  are  obvious  examples  of  how  the 
attitudes and preferences of others can unjustly affect the extent to which an 
individual  can  convert  resources  into  functionings,  Fraser  argues  that 
overcoming  prejudice  is  not  enough  to  realise  justice  as  recognition. 
Recognitional  justice  further  requires  “deinstitutionalising  patterns  of 
cultural value that impede parity of participation and replacing them with 
patterns that foster it,”28 which includes, in some cases, acknowledging group 
differences  as  well  as  commonality.  In  this  way  legal  means  of  assuring 
political equality, as posited by the principle of independence, will often be 
insufficient.  
 
Relational Egalitarianism 
 
This brings us, in an admittedly roundabout way, to relational egalitarianism. 
Fraser  argues  that  the  distributive  and  recognition  spheres  are  co-
fundamental, but I want to suggest that they have a common grounding in 
relational  justice.  Relational  egalitarianism,  however,  is  often  defined 
precisely  in  opposition  to  distributive  equality.  Elizabeth  Anderson,  for 
example,  defines  relational  egalitarianism  as  “a  kind  of  social  relation 
between persons – an equality of authority, status, or standing” and argues 
that  it  is  in  fundamental  disagreement  with  distributive  justice,  which 
focuses  on  the  “distribution  of  non-relational  goods  among  individuals.”29 
Samuel  Scheffler  similarly  distinguishes  the  two,  arguing  that  distributive 
theorists, and luck egalitarians specifically, “have lost touch with the reasons 
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why equality matters to us,”30 which is the intrinsic and instrumental value of 
equality in human relationships. Scheffler argues that the distributive scheme 
should  be  dependent  on  an  understanding  of  what  a  society  of  equals 
requires, and not taken as fundamental itself. By centring our conception of 
equality on notions of responsibility and choice, he argues, we do precisely 
the latter.31  
 
But why should we not think resource egalitarianism might flow in this way 
from a plausible account of relational equality? Christian Schemmel points 
out, after all, that while relational egalitarianism opposes an exclusive focus 
on distributive issues, it still requires a conception of how relational justice 
can  be  realised  through  just  distributions. 32  Dworkin  himself  explicitly 
rejects the characterisation of his approach as purely distributive, claiming 
that he aims at a “more general, embracing form of egalitarianism” under 
which the “political community must treat all its members as equals […] not 
only in its design of economic institutions and practices, but in its conception 
of  freedom,  of  community,  and  of  political  democracy  as  well.”33  This 
suggests  to  me  that,  far  from  being  incompatible,  Dworkin’s  resource 
egalitarianism  might  be  one  of  the  more  appropriate  accounts  for 
implementing relational justice in distributions.  
 
Anderson  answers  this  question  by  identifying  what  she  takes  to  be  a 
fundamental  disagreement  between  relational  and  luck  egalitarian 
approaches  to  justice  –  that  luck  egalitarians  “follow  a  third-person 
conception of justification” while relational egalitarians’ is a second-person 
conception or interpersonal.34 She argues that this interpersonal conception 
of justification has a number of implications for justice, such that injustice is 
necessarily relational – it requires that some specific agent be injured, by 
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some  specific  other  agent(s)  who  acted  in  such  a  way  that  a  reasonable 
complaint could be directed at them that they should have acted otherwise.35  
 
Argument of this Thesis 
 
By  contrast,  the  central  claim  of  this  thesis  will  be  that  resource 
egalitarianism  should  indeed  be  understood  as  one  way  of  realizing  the 
distributive facet of relational egalitarianism, rather than as a competing and 
incompatible approach to justice.  
 
The reconciliation I propose makes use of two broad tactics. On the one hand, 
I argue that relational egalitarianism requires a robust theory of personal 
responsibility itself in order to coherently oppose relational injustices such 
as exploitation. On the other, I argue that resource egalitarianism’s focus on 
personal responsibility is motivated by a dual commitment to the avoidance 
of unjust social relationships, such as exploitation, and to liberal neutrality 
regarding  the  value  of  various  pursuits.  I  hope  to  show  that  resource 
egalitarianism neutralises the effects of brute luck, not so as to put “cosmic 
injustices” to rights, but rather to ensure, insofar as possible, that individuals 
can relate to one another on equitable terms by taking responsibility for the 
effects of their actions.  
 
I will begin by introducing resource egalitarianism, as set out by Dworkin in 
his  1981  paper  ‘What is  Equality? Part  2:  Equality  of  Resources’  and  later 
elaborated in his book Sovereign Virtue. In my first chapter I focus on his 
famous  brute-luck/option-luck  distinction,  and  argue  that  that  distinction 
depends on a highly contextual conception of what it is reasonable to expect 
of one another under various circumstances, informed by the capabilities one 
cannot reasonably be expected to give up or risk losing. I will argue that the 
capabilities approach, as introduced by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, 
might  be  understood,  at  least  in  part,  as  an  attempt  to  identify  those 
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conditions of personal responsibility for one’s choices. I here introduce the 
claim  that  the  legitimate  operation  of  option  luck  depends  upon  specific 
social conditions – most notably the availability to agents of a no-risk option 
through hypothetical insurance. 
 
In chapter 2, I claim that judgments of responsibility for outcomes are central 
to  relational  egalitarianism  itself  since  that  approach  sees  justice  as 
concerned primarily with interpersonal and institutional violations of justice. 
Without the brute luck neutralisation resource egalitarianism recommends 
relational  egalitarianism  cannot  distinguish  between  cases  of  injustice 
(which  are  inherently  relational,  on  that  account)  and  mere  brute  luck 
(operating through an agent who nevertheless lacks responsibility for his 
actions). However, drawing on the work of Allen Buchanan, I will argue that 
the character of any particular instance of luck depends at least in part on its 
social  context  -  whether  it  is  good  or  bad  is  largely  socially  constructed 
through  the  ‘dominant  cooperative  scheme,’  which  sets  the  capabilities 
required  for  full  participation  in  society.  A  central  example  of  this 
phenomenon will be the social model of disability. It will be argued on that 
basis  that  the  dominant  cooperative  scheme  is  an  appropriate  target  of 
relational  justice  appraisal  because  it  is  collectively  chosen.  So  while 
relational egalitarians claim quite plausibly that justice applies only to the 
ways in which agents treat one another, this concern appropriately extends 
to the ways in which we respond to brute luck.  
 
Finally, in chapter 3, I draw out the anti-exploitation motivation of resource 
egalitarianism’s  focus  on  personal  responsibility,  as  expressed  through 
Dworkin’s concern that agents internalise the true costs to others of their 
choices.  I  will  argue  that  these  true  costs  cannot  be  identified  without 
reference to the dominant cooperative scheme introduced above, and that 
the appropriate internalisation of such costs cannot be realised without a 
similar concern for the benefits to the community of individual choices. This 
will  set  the  terms  for  our  reconception  of  hypothetical  insurance  as  a 
mechanism,  not  only  for  neutralising  brute  luck  beyond  the  reach  of   19 
voluntary insurance, but of correctly allocating the diffuse costs and benefits 
of  agents’  choices  and  behaviours.  I  argue,  in  fact,  that  the  condition  of 
reasonable  expectations  identified  in  the  first  chapter  can  be  seen  as  an 
instantiation of the interpersonal conception of justification Anderson holds 
up as the hallmark of a relational theory.36  
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1. Mitigating Misfortune while Respecting 
Responsibility 
 
Dworkin’s  concern  for  personal  responsibility  and  leaving  intact  the 
consequences of choices leads to probably his most influential proposal in 
this domain: the distinction between brute luck and option luck. Brute luck 
refers to those effects of chance outside of one’s control. Paradigmatically 
this would include congenital disabilities or instances of pure misfortune, like 
being  struck  by  lightning.  On  the  other  hand,  option  luck  refers  to  those 
effects of chance that one voluntarily accepts into one’s life. This can include 
obvious instances of risk-taking, such as gambles, or perhaps less obvious 
cases,  such  as  the  decision  of  whether  or  not  to  undertake  a  university 
degree, and in what area.  
 
Dworkin advocates a theory of distributive justice that makes one’s fortunes 
sensitive  to  those  factors  that  are  within  one’s  control,  but  not  to  those 
without. This renders the operation of brute luck a problem. He proposes a 
seemingly  elegant  solution:  that  brute  luck  be  converted  into  option  luck 
through the availability of insurance.  
 
The motivation behind establishing such a distinction seems pretty clear in 
the context of the wider resource egalitarian theory. In his introduction to 
Sovereign Virtue Dworkin outlines his two guiding principles. The first, the 
Principle of Equal Importance, states that the success of a life is objectively 
valuable, and all lives  are equally important. The  second, the Principle  of 
Special  Responsibility,  states:  “one  person  has  a  special  and  final 
responsibility for that success - the person whose life it is.”37 These principles 
seem to enjoy high intuitive plausibility.  
 
In the first place, then, it would be wrong for a theory of justice to ignore the 
plight  of  those  disadvantaged  through  no  fault  of  their  own.  While  life  is 
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naturally unfair, organised society has the capacity to mitigate this unequal 
distribution of benefits and burdens. Dworkin seems to take it as given that a 
society which does not rectify this maldistribution, in as much as is possible, 
fails to display equal concern for persons. On the other hand, it would be 
wrong  to  treat  human  beings  as  mere  victims  of  fate.  We  are  capable  of 
exercising a great deal of control over how well or badly our lives go, and 
ignoring this capacity is often thought to be to disrespect human dignity. For 
this reason it is vitally important that outcomes are sensitive to the choices 
we make.38 How this sensitivity should be realised is the topic of this chapter.  
 
Argument of this Chapter 
As  Dworkin  flags  within  first  breath  of  its  introduction,  the  dichotomy 
between brute luck and option luck is not clear-cut. He suggests that “the 
difference between these two forms of luck can be represented as a matter of 
degree, and we may be uncertain how to describe a particular piece of bad 
luck.”39  Taking  the  example  of  a  person  diagnosed  with  cancer,  Dworkin 
suggests that, while in many instances it would be an obvious case of bad 
brute luck, our intuitions might be different if the victim had been a life-long 
heavy smoker. In the latter case we might say the victim took an unsuccessful 
gamble - he fell foul of bad option luck.  
 
Brute luck is further sub-divided into those instances that can be converted 
into option luck through the availability of elective insurance, and those that 
must  instead  be  neutralised  prior  to  individual  deliberation  through 
hypothetical  insurance.  This  latter  type  is  determined  via  speculation  on 
what agents would choose to insure against if they did not know how the 
brute luck lottery of birth would work out for them.  
 
I want to challenge this interpretation of the instances subject to hypothetical 
insurance,  and  argue  that  there  is  a  wider  set  of  brute  luck  cases  which 
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elective insurance cannot convert. I will first examine the various ways in 
which, by Dworkin’s definition, instances of brute luck might be closed to 
conversion into option luck. I will show how a notion of ‘reasonableness’ that 
has emerged in the secondary literature plays a role in this demarcation, and 
how  these  unconvertible  brute  luck  instances  might  be  covered  by 
hypothetical insurance. This will lead to the question of how reasonableness 
can  guide  decisions  as  to  when  elective  insurance  should  take  over  from 
hypothetical insurance, given dynamic circumstances. 
 
The Limits of Elective Insurance  
 
Dworkin defines option luck as “a matter of how deliberate and calculated 
gambles turn out - whether someone gains or loses through accepting an 
isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined.”40 
Brute luck is defined negatively as “a matter of how risks fall out that are not 
in that sense deliberate gambles.”41 
 
Before  considering  insurance  markets,  actual  or  hypothetical,  we  can  see 
how  this  distinction  reflects  a  natural  intuition  about  justice  Dworkin  is 
drawing upon: it is unfair that someone ends up worse off than others due to 
factors outside of their control, but individuals must be held responsible for 
the control they do exert over their own fate. Life is naturally fraught with 
risk, but not all risks are created equally. There are some effects of chance in 
our  lives  that  are  completely  beyond  our  control,  such  as  one’s  genetic 
predisposition to disability or disease. We tend to feel that, if redistribution is 
ever justified, it is in these cases (to the extent that such redistribution would 
be reasonable given the needs and limited resources of the community as a 
whole).  On  the  other  hand  there  are  those  effects  of  chance  that  are 
completely within our control, in that they are highly avoidable. Skiing down 
a dangerous slope while drunk, for instance, is a very risky thing to do - there 
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are many ways in which one might end up, unluckily, severely injured or 
dead.  Yet  we  would  call  that  misfortune  bad  option  luck  since  it  was 
thoroughly avoidable, and would likely fail to find claims for redistribution 
on justice grounds particularly compelling in these cases. Of course we are 
likely  to  feel  a  humanitarian  impulse  to  provide  medical  care  and 
rehabilitation regardless, but our charitable feelings might be strained if that 
skier fails to take responsibility for her actions and boasts of her intention to 
do it again, knowing we will come to the rescue.  
 
Dworkin’s suggestion is that brute luck can be converted into option luck 
where insurance is available. One effectively chooses to accept the effects of 
various  risks  into  one’s  life  by  choosing  not  to  purchase  certain  policies. 
Hypothetical  insurance  is  introduced  simply  to  deal  with  those  cases  in 
which elective insurance decisions are impossible - where the dice has rolled 
before the individual gets an opportunity to decide for himself what level of 
risk he is willing to accept. In this way all brute luck is either converted into 
option luck, through which agents regain responsibility for the effects chance 
has on their lives, or neutralised altogether such that, as far as is possible, the 
costs of unconvertible brute luck are spread across the whole community.  
 
Problems arise for this account, however, when “deliberate and calculated 
gambles” are impossible for reasons beyond merely arriving too late to the 
scene.  Dworkin’s  definition  of  option  luck  seems  to  map  onto  a  common 
understanding of free will - that for an action to be free, and thus for the 
agent to bear responsibility for its consequences, it must be the case that the 
agent  could  have  done  otherwise.  In  the  context  of  Dworkin’s  resource 
egalitarianism ‘doing otherwise’ means one of two things - either avoiding 
taking the risk itself, or purchasing insurance against that risk. According to 
his  option  luck  definition,  it  is  not  true  that  an  agent  could  have  done 
otherwise if (a) he could not have declined the risk, (b) he could not have 
anticipated the risk involved, or (c) the risk was not isolated.  
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Not  all  risks  fall  to  these  easy  extremes  of  evitability,  however.  In  what 
follows I will examine each of these requirements for option luck in turn, and 
explore the ways in which our understanding of what risks an agent could 
avoid  becomes  hazy.  I  will  draw  upon  similar  worries  in  the  secondary 
literature to support the claim that a notion of ‘reasonableness’ is necessary 
in order to meaningfully draw a line here.  
 
(a) Reasonable Possibility of Decline  
It seems that an intuitive notion of reasonable avoidability is implicitly at 
work in Dworkin’s elucidation of brute luck. He lists being hit by a falling 
meteorite as a case of bad brute luck, even though it is not technically correct 
that  such  an  instance  of  bad  luck  is  completely  unavoidable  -  one  could 
choose to live out the rest of one’s days in a bomb shelter in order to avoid 
the possibility of being struck, for example. It seems natural, however, to say 
that  such  behaviour  would  be  irrational.  The  opportunity  cost  of  such  a 
precaution  far  outweighs  the  actual  cost  of  the  avoided  risk  (one  might 
compare  the  two  by  defining  the  cost  of  being  hit  by  the  meteorite  and 
dividing that by the probability of such an event occurring).  
 
Martin Sandbu strengthens this point, noting:  
 
“it is always possible to eliminate risk altogether by simply reducing 
one’s resource stock in all states of the world to the level it would 
have  in  the  worst  realization  of  the  uncertainty.  Thus  Mary  could 
avoid risk altogether by leading such an overcautious and crippled life 
that an accident would not cause her much loss.”42  
 
It seems, then, that our intuitions are informed by the cost-benefit analyses 
we presume the agent to have engaged in, consciously or not. This opens the 
door to potentially intrusive value judgments – who can decide whether it is 
fair to say I could not decline the risk of running into my burning house to 
save my baby, but that I could decline the same risk to save the only copy of 
my unpublished novel?  In the latter case, further, we might be required to 
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judge the prior cost-benefit analysis I engaged in to decide that it was better 
to keep only one copy of that novel hidden in my desk-drawer for security 
purposes, rather than  guard against  this  precise eventuality by  keeping a 
spare copy elsewhere, where it might fall into the wrong hands.  
 
Dworkin neatly side steps this can of worms by arguing that such instances 
can  always  be  converted  into  option  luck  through  elective  insurance, 
regardless of whether they would have counted as cases of option or brute 
luck prior to such decisions. I will interrogate this supposition in the second 
half of this chapter. First, however, we should look at how this conversion 
might be blocked by his two further conditions on option luck.  
 
(b) Reasonable Anticipation of Risk 
It seems clear that we can’t hold somebody responsible for a risk taken if 
they could not have known that it was a risky action. This, I think, is the 
deeper reason being struck by a falling meteorite is listed by Dworkin as one 
of the paradigmatic cases of brute bad luck “even though I could have moved 
just before it struck if I had had any reason to know where it would strike.”43 
It is not necessary for this instance to intuitively count as brute luck that the 
victim be somehow involuntarily rooted in place such that he could not have 
moved from the  spot  which happened to  be struck (which is  to  say, in a 
strong sense, that he could not have declined the gamble). It is enough that he 
could not have anticipated the (comparative) risk of his action.  
 
It must be possible that the agent could have known something about the risk 
in advance in order to be responsible for the consequences of his actions. 
This  example  shows  why  anticipation  of  risk  might  be  thought  to  be  a 
prerequisite for personal responsibility - without such anticipation there is 
nothing, from the agent’s point of view, distinguishing the various possible 
free actions from one another prior to the actual consequences playing out. 
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Is it sufficient for responsibility that the agent merely could have known the 
risk  she  ran?  Surely  this  would  be  too  demanding.  It  is  true  that  I  could 
become  an  expert  astronomer  and  monitor  the  skies  vigilantly  for  falling 
meteorites, thereby gaining the knowledge necessary to anticipate where a 
strike  would occur. Yet in doing so I  would  likely suffer a  similar  fate to 
Thales and fall foul of another, overlooked threat. 
 
Neither does this condition require full, unequivocal knowledge of the risk, 
however  -  that  would  not  be  demanding  enough  of  the  agent.  To  make 
absolute  knowledge  a  condition  of  responsibility  would  drastically 
undermine our natural understanding of personal responsibility, since we 
can  never  be  sure  what  the  precise  consequences  of  our  actions  will  be. 
Under such a condition I could not be held responsible for someone’s death 
after stabbing them in the chest because it is not absolutely inevitable that 
one will die from such an injury, and therefore I could argue that I didn’t 
anticipate that risk.  
 
We instead need some way of identifying those consequences of one’s actions 
one could reasonably have anticipated under conditions of uncertainty. This 
goes beyond a factual claim about pure possibility into the normative realm.  
 
(c) Reasonable Isolation of Risk  
Another way in which Dworkin suggests one might be unable to decline a 
risk  is  if  it  is  not  ‘isolated’.  As  I  see  it  there  are  at  least  two  ways  of 
interpreting this criterion. 
 
Firstly, the requirement that a risk be ‘isolated’ might simply be another way 
of  stating  the  epistemic  condition.  If  it  is  true  that  a  particular  outcome 
resulted from a composite of various elements of brute and option luck, it 
will  be  impossible  to  accurately  judge  the  portion  of  that  outcome 
attributable to agent responsibility. Sometime in the near future, for instance, 
medical science will likely advance to the point where one can identify one’s   27 
own individual health risk factors. In such an epistemic context one would be 
able  to  see  clearly  the  risks  attributable  to  the  brute  luck  of  the  genetic 
lottery and those attributable to the option luck of one’s lifestyle choices. As 
it stands, however, these risk factors are thoroughly entangled. They are not 
adequately epistemically isolated.  
 
The isolation criterion would surely be redundant under this interpretation, 
however,  in  light  of  the  previous  condition  of  reasonable  anticipation.  A 
second  interpretation,  then,  might  be  that  an  ‘isolated  risk’  is  one  whose 
avoidance does not carry risks of its own. Wolff and de-Shalit identify one 
particularly  worrying  way  in  which  risks  fail  to  be  isolated  in  this  way: 
inverse cross-category risks arise when an agent “acts in a way that puts one 
category [of functioning] at risk while trying to secure another.”44 They point 
to an example, given in Sen’s Development as Freedom, of a poor community 
in the Sundarban who risk attack by the wild Royal Bengal tiger in order to 
collect honey for sale.45 It is true that a member of that community coul d 
avoid the serious risk of death (fifty or more are killed by the tigers each 
year) by refraining from collecting the honey in the forest. But that would be 
to forgo their only available income source  - they can only avoid destitution 
and hunger by collecting the honey and risking attack.  
 
While it is true that in either case one could have done otherwise, one could 
not have avoided both risks. For this reason it would be difficult to argue that 
the individual was responsible for the ill consequence of his choice. We might 
suggest that the relevant instance of luck here is not the option luck of which 
course of action the individual chose, but the brute luck that determined 
these to be the only avenues open to him. Anderson’s objection that “free 
choice within a set of options does not justify the set of options itself”46 is 
particularly pertinent in this regard.47 
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Carl  Knight,  however,  challenges  the  notion  that  compulsory  gambles  are 
always unfree in this way:  
 
“‘[C]ompulsory gambles’ seem also to be cases of option luck, at least 
provided a sufficient range of alternative gamble are available, as the 
gamble  taken  could  have  been  declined  for  another  gamble. 
Occupational  choices,  for  instance,  are  paradigmatic  instances  of 
deliberate and calculated gambles that could have been declined.”48 
 
Occupational choices intuitively do count as cases of option luck. If I were to 
choose to invest in education and training to pursue a career as a skydiving 
photographer it would surely be fair to hold me responsible for that choice 
and that I therefore bear the costs of my expensive decision myself. This is 
simply to affirm Dworkin’s claim that “people should pay the price of the life 
they have decided to lead, measured in what others give up in order that they 
can do so.”49 Yet it is also true that the success of an occupational choice is 
subject  to  risk  -  it  is  notoriously  difficult  to  tell  which  sets  of  skills  and 
expertise will be most in demand once one has completed one’s education 
and training, and the workings of the labour market ensure that there are no 
fully safe bets, or risk-free options. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility 
that expertise in customer service today might be as useful as the skills of a 
skydiving photographer in the near future. 
 
It  is  instructive  here  to  refer  to  Cohen’s  discussion  of  freedom  and 
reasonableness in which Wolff and de-Shalit ground their claim that, in cases 
like  these,  “the  risk  cannot  be  reasonably  avoided  because  there  is  no 
reasonable  alternative.”50  Cohen  argues  for  a  distinction  between  the 
concepts of ‘being free to do A’ and ‘doing A freely’, or not being forced to do 
                                                                                                                                  
systems in place. It would therefore be wrong to suggest that this is a case of brute bad 
luck - we might even suggest that it is merely the case that somebody else has made the 
“deliberate and calculated gamble” to accept these risks on their behalf. This is a central 
concern of this thesis, and shall receive proper attention in subsequent chapters. In the 
meantime we can imagine a fictional scenario in which one’s options truly are naturally 
restricted in this way, as perhaps would be the case on Dworkin’s desert island.  
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A.  This  distinction  again,  turns  on  a  notion  of  reasonableness:  “When  a 
person  is  forced  to  do  something  he  has  no  reasonable  or  acceptable 
alternative  course.  He  need  not  have  no  alternative  at  all.”51  One  way  in 
which an alternative course might be unacceptable is that it is too risky, but 
Cohen claims that it would be wrong to interpret ‘reasonable alternatives’ as 
only those which pose a lesser threat than the given action - if this were true 
then one would be ‘forced’ to always take the least risky path, thereby losing 
responsibility for the costs of that decision.52 Instead, he gives the following 
definition of an acceptable alternative: 
 
“B is an acceptable alternative to A if and only if B is not worse than A 
or B (though worse than A) is not thoroughly bad.”53 
 
Again, cashing out the notion of some course of action being ‘not thoroughly 
bad’ seems to rely on a judgment of what it is reasonable to expect people to 
endure in a given society.  
 
Cumulative Risks and Forced Gambles 
 
Elizabeth  Anderson  famously  takes  aim  at  luck  egalitarian  approaches  to 
distributive justice, including Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism, in her 1999 
paper ‘What is the Point of Equality?’. While her views on the legitimacy of 
egalitarians’  focus  on  distributive  issues  will  be  addressed  in  the  next 
chapter, I want to first address her criticism of luck egalitarianism on the 
grounds that it “excludes some citizens from enjoying the social conditions of 
freedom on the spurious ground that it is their fault for losing them.”54 I don’t 
believe  this  criticism  is  ultimately  successful,  but  it  does  draw  out  an 
important and overlooked requirement of the luck egalitarian commitment.  
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Perhaps  Anderson’s  most  convincing  argument  that  luck  egalitarianism 
treats the victims of bad option luck unjustly is the so-called “problem of the 
abandonment of the prudent.”55 Here she claims that there might be reasons 
for  taking  prudent  gambles  which  undermine  our  intuition  that  the 
individual should bear the full costs when the gamble goes bad. One point we 
must keep mind throughout this analysis is that there is no way to avoid risk 
entirely. Even the  most  sensible choices  carry risks, both foreseeable  and 
unforeseeable,  and  there  is  no  guarantee  that  remote  risks  will  not  be 
catastrophically costly.  
 
I am particularly concerned by the iterative effects of prudent gambles that 
go  wrong.  We  might  term  this  problem  the  ‘cumulative  effects  of  risk.’ 
Anderson  highlights  the  intuitive  injustice  that  in  our  present  capitalist 
societies “single lucky or unlucky blows often place individuals in situations 
of  accumulating  advantage  or  disadvantage”56  where  it  seems  that  the 
consequences  of  even  option  luck  are  completely  disproportional  to  the 
choice  made.  It  strikes  me  additionally  that  our  interest  in  personal 
responsibility should be forward- as well as backward-looking – if we are 
moved by the moral relevance of individual choice then we should want to 
ensure that the conditions of choice are not easily undermined. In this section 
I will first address the threat to the conditions of choice posed by prudent 
gambles, before examining the resulting implications for the harder cases in 
which  the  agent  might  have  been  reasonably  expected  to  have  done 
otherwise.  
 
Prudent Gambles 
Let’s  presume,  first,  that  a  particular  individual’s  bad  option  luck  arose 
through a prudent gamble. Perhaps this island immigrant chose to spend her 
clam shells on a sizeable farm and opted to sow the hardiest available crop 
which produces sufficient grain to feed her family and more besides to sell on 
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the market 99.9% of the time. Alas, the 0.1% eventuality manifests and she 
finds herself with nothing to eat or sell. Being a cautious immigrant, she had 
purchased insurance against such a catastrophe that compensates her such 
that she and her family’s basic needs are met  – they have enough to eat, 
adequate  shelter,  etc.  Nevertheless  they  are  left  with  limited  disposable 
income. The immigrant again takes only the most prudent gambles available. 
She invests a large portion in her children’s education, knowing that it is very 
likely to pay dividends in the future as well as having great intrinsic value 
itself. This investment requires a trade-off and she therefore opts for more 
modest health/disability insurance than she would have prior to the crop 
misfortune, reasoning that since she and her husband are so risk-averse and 
therefore lead extremely healthy lifestyles they are quite unlikely to make 
claims  on  that  insurance  before  they  reach  old  age.  Being  unforeseeably 
unfortunate, however, her non-smoking, marathon-running, teetotal husband 
develops lung-cancer. Their modest insurance covers the required surgery, 
but this leaves him unable to work for a number of years. The consequent 
reduced income  once  more  forces  our prudent immigrant  to  take  greater 
risks than she would otherwise be comfortable with.  
 
It’s undoubtedly possible that this particular immigrant’s luck will change 
and her next forced gamble pays off such that she can afford to return to her 
original cautious approach. Nevertheless given a large population and the 
nature  of  chance  it  is  all  but  inevitable  that  some  will  suffer  bad  luck 
compounded by more bad luck. Indeed we might understand the moral of 
this story as being the expensiveness of prudence – once a gamble is lost one 
has fewer resources with which to guard against risk going forward. If chance 
is  an inevitable  factor in individuals’ distributive shares, fewer and fewer 
people will be able to afford to minimize the impact of risk on their fortunes 
in  successive  gambles.  Anderson  points  out  that  “when  certain  risks  are 
practically [i.e. reasonably] unavoidable, they are not really matters of option 
luck.”57 It is for this reason, I believe, that we must regard the outcomes of 
some unavoidable gambles as instances of brute luck and that the resultant 
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costs and benefits are appropriately assumed by society as a whole through 
the hypothetical insurance mechanism.  
 
To  implement  this  aspect  of  hypothetical  insurance,  however,  we  must 
determine  which  gambles  to  regard  as  ‘forced’  in  this  way.  The  simplest 
answer, I believe, would be to treat as forced those gambles that are the least 
risky of all available. If there is a minimally risky option available to an agent 
and  she  chooses  a  more  risky  option,  she  surely  thereby  assumes 
responsibility for the attending costs. But if she opts for the least risky option 
she cannot be held personally responsible for the costs if that gamble is lost. 
Naturally we must face epistemic complications here as noted above – we 
rarely  know  precisely  the  costs  or  levels  of  risk  associated  with  various 
courses  of  action,  and  often  there  are  courses  of  action  that  are  wholly 
opaque to us. Hypothetical insurance will need to cover not simply the least 
risky option, then, but rather the option(s) most reasonably thought to be 
least risky.   
 
I believe this understanding of brute luck accounts for an objection raised 
against  luck  egalitarianism  concerning  its  alleged  potential  for  unfair 
treatment of the risk-averse. Macleod argues that there are risks associated 
with the imprudent gambles of some that are not internalized as they should 
be to count as truly optional, but are imposed on the rest of the (prudent) 
population. These costs most notably manifest as “an unacceptable degree of 
uncertainty  about  the  sorts  of  lives  people  who  are  not  gamblers  can 
reasonably expect to be able to pursue.”58 This uncertainty can arise through 
production gambles that impact the total stock of resources available, but 
also through risk-lovers’ decisions to forego insurance which can undermine 
the ability of the cautious to avoid risk. Lippert-Rasmussen articulates this 
point as follows: “When there are fewer people  with whom one  can  pool 
risks, those who prefer safer lives may well face worse options in that these 
people will, for a given level of expected value, face higher risks.”59 
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If, under Dworkin’s account, brute luck is converted into option luck through 
the availability of insurance, then that conversion will be blocked if insurance 
is unavailable. Imagine that all but one of the island immigrants are intense 
risk lovers - perhaps one waiter and a Monte Carlo-bound party are the only 
survivors of the shipwreck. After getting their bearings and performing an 
inventory of the resources at their disposal, the waiter suggests that they 
should establish an insurance scheme against blindness, recognising that a 
particular  blindness-inducing  disease  is  especially  prevalent  on  this 
particular  island.  The  gamblers  acknowledge  but  decline  to  pool  the  risk, 
preferring to take their chances alone. As it happens, it is the waiter who is 
struck by the disease.  
 
Is it just, according to resource egalitarianism, that he bears the full costs of 
this disease alone, since as it happened no one was willing to pool the risk of 
those costs with him? Surely not, for his bad luck is still brute, given that the 
gamblers  foreclosed  the  possibility  of  its  conversion  into  option  luck.  Of 
course there are risk-mitigating steps the waiter might have taken himself – 
he might avoid wading through a swamp to reach the fruit trees on the other 
side, or invest some  of his resource-share  in expensive water-purification 
methods – but this is in effect to choose between gambles; it is not the free 
choice to accept the full potential costs and benefits that would constitute 
option luck under Dworkin’s definition. As I argued earlier, to be forced to 
choose  between  gambles,  without  an  option  to  decline  altogether,  is  a 
violation of the Isolation of Risk criterion for option luck. According to my 
understanding  of  hypothetical  insurance,  then,  the  gamblers  do  owe  the 
waiter compensation for his bad luck as a matter of justice, since his bad luck 
remains brute. This would be the case if he had never mentioned anything 
about the possibility of voluntary insurance to the gamblers, and it would 
surely  be  strange  for  such  a  matter  of  justice  to  turn  on  his  voicing  that 
option.  
   34 
This type of hypothetical insurance will guarantee (insofar as possible) the 
conditions  of  free  choice  for  subsequent  gambles  when  the  individual 
chooses the most reasonably prudent option. But what happens when the 
agent chooses a riskier course of action?  
 
Imprudent Quasi-Gambles 
Now we must recognise another pertinent distinction – this time regarding 
the motivation for risk-taking. In the above example, the shipwrecked party 
bound for Monte Carlo enjoy gambling precisely because of its risky nature. It 
would take all the fun out of blackjack if they were guaranteed a specific 
return,  no  more  and  no  less.  These  are  ‘gambles  proper’  defined  by  the 
player’s preference for “facing the gamble to having its expected value.”60 
When luck egalitarians discuss gambles, however, they refer to a wider range 
which  includes  quasi-gambles.  These  are  gambles  “in  which  the  gambler 
prefers  the  expected  value  of  the  gamble  to  facing  the  gamble.”61  It  is 
commonly understood that insurance is a gamble of the latter type.   
 
Let’s imagine then, that the waiter additionally proposes insurance against 
the adverse consequences of eating berries native to the island that he knows 
to  be  delicious  but  highly  poisonous.  He  has  no  desire  for  the  risk  of 
poisoning  itself  and  would  much  prefer  if  these  berries  were  perfectly 
benign. Given that this is sadly not the case, however, his next best option is 
to  convince  the  other  immigrants  to  pool the  risk  with him and fund his 
medical care if the berries do make him sick – this would be a quasi-gamble. 
In such a case it would be reasonable for the gamblers (who have no desire to 
try the berries themselves, as it happens) to require that the waiter either 
refrain from indulging his taste or bear the costs alone, and refuse to engage 
in optional insurance with him against its attendant risks. There is already a 
low-risk option available to the waiter – that of simply not eating the berries 
–  and  so  there  is  no  justice  requirement  that  such  an  option  be  socially 
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created through insurance. Here, then, the notion of reasonable expectations 
finds a decisive role to play in distinguishing between brute luck and option 
luck; between risks subject to hypothetical versus elective insurance.  
 
Is it acceptable from the point of view of justice that the gamblers deny the 
waiter medical care when he nevertheless poisons himself? Clearly Dworkin 
does not mean for his hypothetical insurance scheme to limit us to only ever 
choosing the most prudent option open to us at any given juncture, for that is 
no choice at all. He merely intends that we take account of the costs of such 
actions,  and  proposes  extensive  cost-internalisation  as  the  simplest 
mechanism  to  achieve  that  end.  There  are  at  least  two  possible 
interpretations of this cost-internalisation requirement. On the one hand we 
might say that once an individual deviates from the minimal risk option, she 
assumes fully the potential costs and benefits of that course of action (which 
she may or may not choose to pool with similar risk-takers). On the other 
hand  we  could  argue  that  the  individual,  in  assuming  more  risk  than  is 
strictly necessary, thereby assumes only the portion of risk additional to that 
of the naturally forced gamble. We respect her right to choose that course of 
action, and in doing so she takes personal ownership of the potential rewards 
and costs of that decision, but there remains a greater or lesser portion of 
those rewards and costs that she had no control over and that are therefore 
rightly subject to neutralisation through the hypothetical insurance scheme.  
 
Assume  for simplicity that the berries have a  substantial and well-known 
chance of causing blindness in those who ingest them, an eventuality already 
insured against due to the unavoidable risk posed by the blindness-inducing 
disease on the island. The waiter again goes blind, but this time the islanders 
have no way to tell whether his condition is due to the berries he ate or the 
disease.  What  obligations  do  they  have  to  provide  medical  care  and 
expensive  accommodations  for  his  blindness?  We  might  propose  that  the 
hypothetical insurance payout be discounted to match the probability that 
his condition was self-caused, but this would presumably require potentially 
unjustified invasive monitoring to determine how many berries he ate, if he   36 
in fact ate any at all. If, unbeknownst to anyone, he decided not to run the risk 
of consuming the berries it will surely be unjust to penalise him as though he 
had.  We  might  instead  suggest  that  the  cost  of  the  treatment  or 
accommodation of his disability if his gamble goes bad, discounted by the 
probability of it doing so, be applied directly to the risky behaviour rather 
than after the  dice  is  rolled. In  Dworkin’s initial auction this  might mean 
pricing  the  berries  not  merely  according  to  the  demand  among  the 
immigrants  for  them,  but  also  according  to  the  probable  costs  they  will 
impose on the rest of the society through their ill effects. This idea is used in 
the real world, for example, to justify high taxes on cigarettes at the point of 
purchase.  
 
This approach might be understood as equivalent to an elective insurance 
scheme  amongst  those  who  undertake  unnecessary  risks.  It  is  elective, 
however, only to the extent that the risky behaviour is engaged in electively. 
Under this scheme it is not possible for an individual to waive his right to 
medical care if the gamble goes bad in return for a lower price. In this way it 
is possible to deviate from the most prudent course of action without thereby 
forfeiting  one’s  right  to  assistance  or  risking  the  cumulative  effects  of 
subsequently forced gambles. One can internalize the costs associated with a 
particular quasi-gamble without risking one’s future freedom to decline to 
gamble  and  a  possible  resultant  slide  into  destitution,  as  is  Anderson’s 
concern.  
 
These  suggestions  regarding  the  relationship  between  hypothetical  and 
elective insurance are sketchy and have yet to be offered justification. The 
proposal  that  agents  be  required  to  ‘electively’  insure  against  the  more 
drastic risks associated with optional gambles, especially, will face the charge 
of paternalism – why should an adult of sound mind and body be blocked 
from genuinely risking her basic capabilities, waiving all right to rescue, if she 
so chooses? It is merely my intention to show that if relational egalitarianism 
requires such limits on individual freedom, then these restrictions will form 
part  of  the  resource  egalitarian  scheme  through  hypothetical  insurance.   37 
However I must first demonstrate how it is that these approaches overcome 
their apparent incompatibility. This is the task of my next chapter.  
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2. Interpersonal Responsibility: Exploitation and the 
Social Construction of Luck 
 
To refresh our memories, my intention in this thesis is to show how resource 
egalitarianism  can  be  understood  as  an  instantiation  of  relational 
egalitarianism in the distributive sphere. Yet relational egalitarians accuse 
theories  of  justice  that  focus  on  the  neutralisation  of  brute  luck  of 
fundamentally misunderstanding the object of justice, which is the manner in 
which agents treat one another. Since resource egalitarianism is just such a 
theory,  it  would  seem  my  project  is  doomed  before  it  ever  gets  off  the 
ground.  
 
The problem with an exclusive focus on natural inequalities is easy to see 
when we look at some luck egalitarian attempts to subsume relational issues 
within its scheme. Nicholas Barry, for example, claims that exploitation “is a 
matter of structural relations between social groups and therefore reflects 
brute luck.”62 He offers the specific example of women’s exploitation through 
their  restricted  option  sets  and  enforced  norms,  and  claims  that  because 
women “are not responsible for the way gender roles are constructed, the 
lower  well-being  that  results  is  a  matter  of  brute  bad  luck.”63  But  this 
characterisation  misses  the  relational  egalitarians’  point  entirely.  By 
attributing women’s oppression to ‘brute bad luck’ one fails to recognize the 
concrete  causes  of  that  oppression  and  potentially  blinds  oneself  to  the 
available structural solutions. Additionally, failing to identify this aspect of 
responsibility  surely  undermines  luck  egalitarianism’s  responsibility-
catering credentials.  
 
How  might  resource  egalitarianism  incorporate  relational  impacts  on 
individual  outcomes  without  running  afoul  of  this  equivocation?  Hillel 
Steiner claims that “the causal factors contributing to a person’s incurring 
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adverse  (or  benign)  consequences  can  be  exhaustively  consigned  to  a 
threefold classification: (1) her own doings; (2) the doings of others; and (3) 
the doings of nature.”64 Dworkin’s True-Cost Principle offers a guide as to 
how costs arising from the ‘the doings of others’ should be apportioned. It 
states that “people must pay the actual cost of the choices they make, or the 
choices that are properly attributed to them, measured by the cost to others 
of those choices.”65 These are defined in terms of opportunity costs, which fix 
“the value of any transferable resource one person has as the value others 
forgo by his having it.”66  
 
On this basis equality of resources can be understood fundamentally as an 
attempt to avoid the exploitative relationships Dworkin identifies in other 
egalitarian distributive theories, encapsulated by the Problem of Expensive 
Tastes. Where Cohen, for example, suggests that the expense associated with 
one’s preferences and ambitions constitutes an instance of brute luck since 
such costs are not within any one individual’s control (even if their tastes 
largely are),67 Dworkin argues that the market conveys information morally 
relevant to individuals’ choices in a way that transmits responsibility. The 
preferences of others are not matters of brute luck but rather form part of 
the ‘parameters of justice.’  
 
“The mix of personal ambitions, attitudes, and preferences that I find 
in my community, or the overall state of the world’s resources, is not 
in itself either fair or unfair to me; on the contrary, that mix is among 
the facts that fix what it is fair or unfair for me to do or to have.”68  
 
Dworkin’s liberalism leads him to endorse the market as the best mechanism 
by which to identify the opportunity costs of one’s choices to others, though, 
as  noted  in  our  introduction,  he  proposes  a  number  of  supplementary 
principles  to  correct  for  market  imperfections.  In  this  way  some 
interpersonal impacts on individual outcomes are perfectly just – indeed they 
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define the contours of justice. Just as my own tastes and preferences are not 
matters of brute luck, but “interwoven with judgments of endorsement and 
approval,”69 so too are the tastes and preferences of others.  
 
Argument of this Chapter 
In this chapter I hope to undermine the seeming incompatibility of relational 
and resource egalitarianism by showing how a great portion of misfortune 
often understood to be traceable to mere brute bad luck is actually of central 
concern to relational egalitarians. This, I will argue, is because the ‘dominant 
cooperative scheme’ found in a given society is itself the result of choices 
made by those within the society, historically as well as contemporaneously, 
and  that  in  many  cases  this  cooperative  scheme  plays  a  large  role  in 
determining what counts as good or bad luck. In this way the opportunity 
costs to those disadvantaged by the cooperative scheme must be taken into 
account if the True-Cost Principle is to be honoured, even though such costs 
are, by definition, untraceable to any identifiable agent or set of agents bar 
the community taken as a whole.  
 
By the same token, I believe, resource egalitarianism must also take what 
might  be  termed  ‘true-benefits’  into  account.  One  prominent  relational 
critique of many distributive theories, including equality of resources, targets 
their  individualism.  Agents  are  treated  as  acting  purely  from  their  own 
preferences, even if those  preferences  happen  to  be other-regarding. This 
approach  is  rooted,  not  in  disdain  for  community-mindedness,  but  in  a 
necessary commitment to the value of liberal pluralism. Yet as a result the 
benefits  of  an  agent’s  actions  are  afforded  little  attention  since  they  are 
presumed to accrue primarily to the agent herself. Anderson argues that the 
problem  with  such  approaches  is  that  they  disable  “criticism  of  social 
arrangements  that assign  to  individuals the  risk of  weighty costs to their 
choices, even when those choices are socially necessary – even when there is 
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a shared interest in having people make those choices.”70 I will argue that, 
while  the  market  is  unable  to  account  for  many  of  these  benefits  to  the 
community and their individual costs, Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance is an 
ideal stand-in.  
 
The Social Construction of Luck 
 
In ‘The Fundamental Disagreement Between Luck Egalitarians and Relational 
Egalitarians’ Anderson outlines four constraints on what counts as injustice 
based on her understanding of justice as inherently interpersonal. She argues 
on that basis that “[t]he fundamental luck egalitarian claim, that inequalities 
due  to  brute  luck  are  unjust,  fails  to  satisfy  [the  relational  egalitarian] 
constraints because it does not identify an injury or anyone responsible for 
avoiding or remedying it.” In this section, then, I will argue that resource 
egalitarians’ motivation to neutralise ‘brute bad luck’ is implicitly grounded 
in  the  fact  that,  in  many  cases  at  least,  its  badness  is  interpersonally 
determined. For there are innumerable instances of brute luck (the colour of 
one’s eyes, for instance) that issue no negative social consequences and for 
that  reason,  it  seems,  do  not  strike  us  as  grounding  claims  for  social 
mitigation.  
 
Responsibility and the Dominant Cooperative Scheme 
Anderson  holds  up  an  interpersonal  conception  of  justification  as  the 
hallmark  of  relational  egalitarianism  in  contrast  to  the  ‘third-person 
conception’ allegedly underlying luck egalitarianism. She draws here upon 
Stephen  Darwall’s  account  of  justice  as  essentially  concerning  “individual 
claim rights, which ground duties of others to pay due regard to individual’s 
interests.”71 From this understanding of justice Anderson seeks to undermine 
the luck egalitarian principle, as proffered by Cohen, that “inequalities in the 
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distribution of natural  endowments are unjust,”72  or, more  modestly, that 
socially  sustaining  such  natural  inequalities  is  unjust,73  claiming  this 
principle cannot be correct since such natural inequalities are not traceable 
to any agent(s). While I will hold off analysis of the specifics of the argument 
between Anderson, Cohen and Dworkin regarding the legitimate role of 
natural endowment inequalities till the next chapter, for now I want to 
consider how relational egalitarians might distinguish natural from social 
inequalities.  
 
Cohen’s own account of interpersonal justification brings most clearly into 
focus,  I  believe,  the  way  in  which  relational  equality  is  violated  when 
relational impacts on individual outcomes are treated as mere instances of 
brute luck. In ‘Incentives, Inequality, and Community’ Cohen mounts a case 
against  the  Rawlsian  incentives  argument  for inequality on  the  basis  that 
such arguments fail the ‘Interpersonal Test’ – they are rendered incoherent 
when expressed by the agent(s) whose behaviour determines the argument’s 
empirical premise. In that specific case the argument involves a normative 
premise,  that  “[e]conomic  inequalities  are  justified  when  they  make  the 
worst off people materially better off”;74 and an empirical premise, that the 
talented rich utilise their talents in such a way as to make the worst off better 
off  only  when  they  receive  material  incentives  i.e.  only  when  there  is 
economic inequality in their favour.  
 
The point for our present purposes is that Cohen here exposes one of the 
ways  in  which  “the  rich  may  represent  their  own  optional  attitudes  and 
decisions as given facts.”75 Just as in the incentives case the talented rich 
present  as  fact  their  choice,  as  Cohen  sees  it,  to  withhold  (or  to  present 
themselves as likely to withhold) productivity unless economic inequality is 
instantiated  or  allowed  to  continue  to  benefit  them,  those  with  certain 
natural endowments present as similarly natural the social systems which 
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favour  those  endowments,  when  in  reality  those  systems  are  social 
constructions open to modification. In doing so they “imply that they do not 
qualify as choosing agents”76 in this regard, thereby alienating themselves 
from their own responsibility for the given state of affairs. The social model 
of disability highlights the fact that the choice of the ‘dominant cooperative 
scheme’  is  indeed  a  choice  and  therefore  appropriately  subject  to 
interrogation  regarding  responsibility  and  the  allocation  of  its  attendant 
costs and benefits. 
 
Contemptuous Pity 
One  of  Anderson’s  three  core  objections  to  luck  egalitarian  theories 
specifically is her allegation that they express “contemptuous pity for those 
who are judged to have done badly out of the natural lottery.” 77 She suggests 
that under these accounts in order to receive compensation for the brute bad 
luck of being born into some form of disadvantage citizens must endorse a 
judgment that they are inferior to others, and in this way such approaches 
cannot  achieve  relational  equality.  In  doing  so  Anderson  highlights  the 
expressive aspect of supposedly purely distributive theories and the various 
ways in which such judgments can run contrary to justice as recognition. On 
her  understanding,  luck  egalitarianism  “disparages  the  internally 
disadvantaged and raises private disdain to the status of officially recognised 
truth.”78  
 
Anderson’s point cannot be, however, that no one is naturally disadvantaged 
in comparison to anyone else, as that would be plainly absurd. An account 
that presupposes everyone begins on a level playing field would run contrary 
to the recognition insights she endorses. The question must instead be how 
we might develop an objective, respectful account of disadvantage and the 
obligation to alleviate it, which retains a central commitment to the equal 
moral worth of persons.  
                                                 
76 Cohen (1991), p309 
77 Anderson (1999), p289 
78 Anderson (1999), p306   44 
 
Despite Dworkin’s staunch opposition to welfare equality Anderson claims 
that his hypothetical insurance scheme ushers in welfare metrics through the 
back door, based on the supposition that it “would treat two people with the 
same disability [or, more generally, the same internal features] differently, 
depending on their tastes.”79 In this way the problem of expensive (and, for 
that  matter,  cheap)  tastes  infects  resource  egalitarianism.  If,  as  Anderson 
supposes, compensation for internal features is paid out on the basis of what 
the individual in question would have insured against in the original position, 
there would be nothing to stop someone who judges the possession of an 
unappealing visage to be unbearable from demanding that the state fund the 
“remedy” of this “bad” luck through plastic surgery. On the same logic anyone 
traditionally regarded as disadvantaged through brute bad luck, such as by 
being  born  deaf,  would  not  be  entitled  to  compensation  if  they  were  to 
embrace that internal feature, as many members of the Deaf community do.80 
Dworkin (wrongly, I will argue below) bites this bullet in  ‘Sovereign Virtue 
Revisited,’  conceding  that  if  the  deaf  individual  “would  not  submit  to  a 
costless and painless medical procedure […] that would give him hearing”81 it 
is safe to say he would not have purchased insurance against such an internal 
feature in the original position and therefore is entitled to no compensation.  
 
I think we can understand these issues as rooted in confusion over how to 
identify bad luck. This should be unsurprising given that any particular event 
or feature can be good, bad or neutral for any individual depending on the 
context. Even to be struck dead by a heart-attack out of the blue in the prime 
of one’s youth might constitute an instance of good luck if, say, one were at 
that moment awaiting imminent torture and execution. Dworkin agrees with 
capabilities theorists that “people want resources not simply to have them 
but to do something with them,”82 and we might extend this conception of 
value to instances of luck - matters of chance are valued, not intrinsically, but 
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in what they do for us. Sometimes what they do for us is indeed just a matter 
of welfare, where my idiosyncratic tastes are the sole determining context 
(getting caught in a heavy downpour might constitute good or bad luck for 
me,  depending  on  whether  such  an  experience  gives  me  pleasure  or 
discomfort). But most of the time we judge an instance of luck by its effects 
on what we are able to do, which, as we saw in our earlier account of the 
capabilities  approach,  is  determined  by  the  various  conversion  factors  at 
play.  Good  luck,  then,  constitutes  some  instance  of  chance  that,  upon 
interaction with these conversion factors, expands one’s option set (and by 
extension one’s ability to achieve welfare). Bad luck restricts that option set 
in the given context. 
 
I  argued  in  the  introduction  that  Dworkin  implicitly  appeals  to  this 
capabilities’  notion  of  conversion  factors  in  his  description  of  the 
hypothetical  insurance  scheme,  which  functions  as  a  way  of  evaluating 
external  against  internal  resources  and  calculating  appropriate 
compensation  for  bad  luck  regarding  the  options  one’s  internal  features 
block.  Hypothetical  insurance  thus  reflects,  not  each  individual’s 
idiosyncratic tastes, but rather contingent facts about how brute luck can 
limit people’s freedom to develop and pursue those tastes. As there flagged, 
however, these include facts about the tastes and preferences of others in 
one’s community.  
 
How  would  this  interpretation  of  resource  egalitarianism  treat  the 
misfortune of an unattractive face, then? Dworkin suppose it to be “incredible 
that the bulk of citizens of any community would have paid the extravagant 
premiums necessary for cosmetic or vanity insurance.”83 But that is not to 
reject  the  charge  that  subjective  welfare  considerations  contaminate 
hypothetical insurance with ‘private disdain’ for certain personal features – it 
merely  reminds  us  that  hypothetical  insurance  is  not  determined  by 
individual preferences but rather the aggregated probable preferences of all 
relevant individuals, and asserts that such disdain would not be shared by a 
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sufficient portion of the population. The real question, I think, is whether 
such an internal feature tends to limit one’s option set in such a way that it 
would have been rational for any agent to purchase insurance to restore, 
insofar as possible, the compromised capabilities. In the case of appearance 
we can assume any impact on capabilities would be attributable to social 
conversion factors, which we have singled out  as an (implicit) element of 
Dworkin’s theory in need of more attention. While the affected individual’s 
own  preferences  don’t  figure  in  the  resource  egalitarian’s  judgment  of 
whether or not they are entitled to compensation, Anderson rightly notes 
that “the claims a person makes […] are a function of everyone’s tastes,”84 
insofar as others’ preferences influence one’s capabilities.  
 
In  this  way  hypothetical  insurance  may  indeed  endorse  “private  disdain”, 
depending on how it responds to these social conversion factors. It is for this 
reason Anderson claims that “people, not nature, are responsible for turning 
the  natural  diversity  of  human  beings  into  oppressive  hierarchies.”85  The 
‘contemptuous pity’ criticism thus highlights the question we must answer 
regarding  the  legitimacy  of  the  impact  on  one  another’s  capabilities  of 
personal preferences regarding one another’s internal features.  
 
The Social Model of Disability 
We have argued that whether a given instance of luck is good, bad or neutral 
depends  on  its  impact  on  one’s  capabilities  and  welfare,  and  one’s  social 
context is one of the main determinants of that impact. In this way, though 
brute  luck  is  beyond  the  control  of  the  primary  affected  individual,  its 
character is determined, in part, by other agents.  
 
The social model of disability is one prominent example of the way in which 
brute luck can be socially constructed, and highlights the role of recognition 
in  identifying  where  costs  and  benefits  are  hidden  through  necessary-
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appearing contingencies. Advanced by disability activists in the 70s and 80s, 
the  social  model  suggests  that  one’s  internal  features  are  not  always  in 
themselves  good  or  bad,  but  often  rather  rendered  so  by  ill-suited  social 
structures. Allen Buchanan refers to the social context of ability and disability 
as “the infrastructure for interaction” or “dominant cooperative scheme” and 
claims that it consists of at least two elements – “the physical infrastructure, 
for example, buildings, machinery, etc., and the institutional infrastructure, 
roughly the rules and norms of interaction.”86  
 
It  must  be  underlined  here  that  the  social  environment  is  not  the  sole 
determinant of disability. Tom Shakespeare, a pre-eminent disability theorist 
and person with a disability himself, argues that “[i]n many circumstances, 
impairment is problematic in itself, as well as having broader cultural and 
political consequences.”87 Many disabilities, for example, cause physical pain 
and discomfort for the affected individual, and the badness of such features 
cannot be attributed to their social context – it just is bad to suffer in this 
way. We must keep in mind, therefore, the elements of genuine brute bad 
luck inherent to these disabilities.  
 
If  disability  is  understood  as  at  least  in  part,  however,  as  a  ‘lack  of  fit’ 
between the individual and his social environment then it becomes clear that 
there are at least two distinct possible responses - we can choose to change 
the individual or that environment (or, more likely, both) – and there has 
been  much  debate  as  to  which  best  expresses  respect  for  the  affected 
individual.  Jonathan  Wolff  has  noted,  for  example,  that  “a  social  policy 
requiring individuals to undergo physical change in order to function well 
encourages the idea that there is something wrong with such people, and that 
they need to be cured.”88 That is to say we must be mindful of the attitudes 
and  judgments  expressed  in  the  way  society  responds  to  this  aspect  of 
diversity.  
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I want to focus for now, however, on what the social model tells us about 
responsibility in these particular cases of supposed brute bad luck, and what 
implications  we  can  draw  with  regard  to  the  just  allocation  of  costs  and 
benefits.  Buchanan  emphasises  that,  though  the  prevailing  cooperative 
scheme was not chosen by any one individual or group, but rather emerged 
organically, it is that system that largely determines “who will and who will 
not  be  disabled.”89 Shakespeare  stresses  that it  is  “only when  society has 
developed certain expectations of its members [that] the lack of ability to 
fulfil those expectations become[s] obvious and problematic,” and offers as 
an example people possessing the internal features of dyslexia who would 
not have been regarded as suffering from a disability in previous generations 
when the various societal institutions and the labour market did not require 
ordinary citizens to be especially literate.90  
 
By upholding the dominant cooperative scheme in light of this understanding 
then, Buchanan argues, we consciously allow that some people will remain 
disabled relative to their social environment. His point is not that this should 
be necessarily lamented or condemned, but that we should  make these 
communal decisions consciously. For what we do in choosing whether or not 
to change the cooperative scheme we inherit (and we have chosen to do so in 
many ways in recent decades through various accessibility initiatives) is to 
balance the interests of those with particular internal features against others. 
In this way we can see that the brute bad luck of being born with a disability 
is, at least in part, a relational issue. 
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Capabilities and Disability 
How might resource egalitarianism incorporate this understanding of luck? 
We mentioned earlier the potential problem posed for Dworkin’s scheme by 
the  example  of  a  deaf  individual,  Dan,  who  would  refuse  a  hypothetical 
simple medical procedure to restore his hearing. This specific example comes 
from Andrew Williams’ paper on the strengths of the capabilities approach as 
compared to resource egalitarianism, where he argues that “it is possible for 
proponents  of  the  capability  approach  to  argue  that  the  inequality  in 
communicative capabilities between Dan and the nondeaf majority is unfair 
in a way that is unconditional on Dan’s attitudes.” 91 Dworkin responds by 
objecting that, if Dan genuinely prefers being deaf, it would be to express 
contemptuous  pity  if  the  community  were  to  nevertheless  treat  him  as 
having suffered bad luck and compensate him as such. His being deaf may 
indeed be a matter of brute luck but Dan clearly does not see that luck as bad 
and it would be very strange and disrespectful for the community to tell him 
that his judgment on that count is incorrect.92  
 
But  Williams’s  original  description  of  Dan’s  case  emphasises  that  the 
dominant  cooperative  scheme  relies  on  the  hearing  capacity  in  everyday 
communication  such  that  his  ability  to  communicate  with  the  wider 
population is reduced. Dan doesn’t regret this primarily because he sees that 
capability-inhibition  as  outweighed  by  his  membership  of  the  deaf 
community  and  capability  for  communication  within  it.  Surely  he  does, 
however, have reason  to regret that his communicative community is not 
larger than it is. It is a matter of brute luck that the majority of people are 
born with hearing and that its efficiency leads them to prefer speech to sign 
language.  
 
Dan’s preference is now for a communicative community solely comprised of 
deaf  and  hearing-impaired  persons,  perhaps  because  he  has  found  the 
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majority  of  hearing  people  in  his  life to  be  stubborn  in their  unreflective 
acceptance of speech as the best means of communication, or prejudiced in 
their implied belief that deaf people’s words are not worth learning how to 
hear. But what would he have judged in the original position in ignorance of 
the internal capacities he would or would not posses? It’s quite possible that 
his  preference  for  non-verbal  communication  is  not  merely  adaptive  and 
would remain intact in that position before he discovers whether or not he is 
deaf.  Speech  is  not,  after  all,  necessarily  superior  in  all  regards  to  sign 
language  or  other  non-verbal  methods  of  communication.  Faced  with  the 
uncertainty, then, of whether he would be born with the capability to hear, 
what sort of insurance would Dan purchase? It is important to emphasise 
that  without  hypothetical  insurance  cover  there  would  be  none  of  the 
publicly-funded  accessibility  accommodations  to  which  we  have  become 
accustomed which foster communication between the hearing and the deaf. 
Furthermore, from the original position Dan cannot rely on the existence of 
such a strong Deaf community as he now enjoys. But, importantly, neither 
can he suppose that the dominant communicative scheme will be as speech-
dependent as it happens to be. The social model of disability tells us that 
much of the good luck of possessing a given capability is that it fits with the 
capabilities of the general population.  
 
Contrary, then, to Dworkin’s response to Williams’ challenge, the capabilities 
approach  does  not  necessarily  “insist  that  the  capacity  for  hearing  is 
objectively more important than the capacity to participate in a world of the 
deaf,”93  though  he  is  right  to  be  vigilant  against  the  potential  for  such 
underlying  assumptions.  Rather,  the  capabilities  approach  recognises  the 
value of a cooperative scheme, and the reliance of such schemes on shared 
capabilities.  For Dan to opt for no insurance at all would be to run the risk of 
completely lacking the capability to communicate with others. But it would 
be imprudent for him to insure specifically against lacking the capacity for 
hearing,  since  the  dominant  scheme  only  contingently  relies  on  that 
capability. Rather, it would make most sense for Dan to insure against lacking 
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the  capability  to  communicate  easily  within  whatever  scheme  he  finds 
himself, and to the extent that such insurance might realise that capability, 
whether through medical, technological or social means.  
 
Buchanan does distributive justice a great service by elucidating the costs 
involved on both sides of decisions like these. On the one hand, those with 
impairments  in  any  given  arena  have  an  interest  in  the  design  of  the 
dominant cooperative scheme including them. On the other hand, those with 
abilities in that arena have an interest in the dominant cooperative scheme 
making  full  use  of  those  abilities  so  as  to  maximise  efficiency.94  When 
deciding on a hypothetical insurance policy one has to reason from both 
positions, not just in regard to the capabilities of hearing versus signing, or 
the capabilities relevant to the broader arena of com munication, but those 
relevant to all aspects of the dominant cooperative scheme.  
 
Social Compensation for Natural Disadvantage 
To conclude this section, let’s return to the relational egalitarian account of 
the justice-relevance of natural inequalities. Thomas Pogge demonstrates his 
relational allegiance and endorses Anderson’s critique of pure distributivism 
in his proposal of the ‘active conception of justice,’ which treats social, rather 
than natural, inequalities as the primary concern of justice. On that basis he 
criticises purely recipient-oriented95 conceptions, which he characterizes as 
fundamentally  consequentialist  in  their  approach  to  justice.96  He  points 
towards our intuitions regarding organ redistribution cases as evidence for 
the claim that “we ought to distinguish between treating recipients justly and 
promoting a good distribution among recipients and, more generally, between 
how subjects treat and how they affect their recipients.”97 He argues that we 
tend to think it unjust (not merely grizzly) to take superfluous organs from 
healthy citizens and transfer them to citizens who have been disadvantaged 
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by the natural lottery,98 which is to say that, at least in some cases, using 
social benefits to compensate for natural handicaps is unjust.  
 
At the same time natural inequalities do retain a role in the calculus of justice 
under  Pogge’s  relational  account.  It  is  presumed  wrong,  for  instance,  to 
allocate a donated kidney to one who already has one functioning kidney 
over one who has none (due purely to brute bad luck), for to do otherwise 
would be to unjustly favour the former over the latter, compounding natural 
inequalities. While the natural distribution of healthy organs is “neither just 
nor  unjust,”99  Pogge  agrees  that  the  social  rules  for  responding  to  such 
natural  inequality  are an  appropriate  target of  justice  appraisal.  We  have 
argued in this section that the effects of a natural instance of brute luck are 
largely determined by its social context, and Pogge endorses this view.100 As 
such, conceding to relational egalitarians that brute luck itself is beyond the 
domain of justice at least arguably leaves intact the resource egalitarian 
concern for the way in which social and economic institutions respond to 
that luck.  
 
Diffuse Benefits and Collective Commissioning 
 
We mentioned in the introduction to this chapter Anderson’s criticism of luck 
egalitarianism’s seeming inability to account for socially necessary choices. 
We discussed in the previous chapter the problem of cumulative risk from 
gambles  individuals  are  forced  by  circumstance  to  take.  Anderson 
additionally points out that the comprehensive division of labour in modern 
society means our economy is best understood as “a system of cooperative, 
joint  production,”101  which  seems  to  undermine  the  appeal  of  luck 
egalitarianism’s strict risk-internalisation. Each of us relies on an economic 
system in which individuals take risks in how they invest their limited time 
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and resources, and so, Anderson claims, it is not always fair that individuals 
bear the full costs of such gambles when they go bad.  
 
It is at this point Anderson suggests that we should understand ourselves as 
“collectively commissioning” one another to take various risks for the benefit 
of the community.102  
 
“When  everyone  shares  an  interest  in  some  people  making  risky 
choices  –  when,  in  effect,  society  has  commissioned  them  to  be 
farmers, miners, mothers, and so forth – it is unfair to disavow any 
share in the costs associated with commissioning people to take up 
these roles.”103 
 
An  immediate  objection  to  this  line  of  thought  is  that  understanding  the 
economy in such a way obscures the workings of the market in many cases. 
Alexander Brown points out that “[i]t is questionable to say the least that 
consumers commission producers to act as their agents. Consumers merely 
display  a  willingness  to  buy  products  if  the  price  and  quality  of  those 
products is attractive to them.”104 It would be hard to say, for example, that 
someone  who  has  no  interest  in  videogames,  has  never  bought  one,  and 
resents their impact on society, nevertheless commissions the work of those 
in the videogame industry and thus has the relevant responsibilities towards 
those  workers.  It surely makes most  sense  in  these cases to  say that the 
commissioning of workers to produce goods and provide services is done by 
consumers (and intermediately by employers) rather than by the community 
as a whole.  
 
Yet while the market may be the best mechanism for apportioning liability in 
situations where the benefits of risk-taking accrue to identifiable persons, it 
is arguably much more difficult to apply in situations where the benefits of 
individual  choices  and  actions  are  diffuse.  Some  form  of  collective 
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commissioning  might  thereby  constitute  a  much  more  appropriate 
conception of how risks and costs should be borne in these cases.  
 
Socially Necessary Individual Choices 
A paradigm example of a socially necessary costly individual choice is the 
decision  to  raise  a  child.  Though  far  too  often  the  voluntariness  of  this 
decision  is  unjustly  undermined  by  societal  and  interpersonal  conditions, 
many  do  assume  the  responsibility  of  childrearing  voluntarily  and 
enthusiastically. They act out of a genuine preference for having children, 
with which they identify and would in no way prefer to be without. For many, 
the having and raising of children is judged to be an essential aspect of what 
it is to lead a good and meaningful life. In such cases this preference, under 
Dworkin’s account, qualifies as an expensive taste, and as such those who 
choose to accept the responsibilities of parenthood have no claim on the rest 
of society for aid in bearing its costs. 
 
This is to ignore the benefits we all enjoy by living in a society in which 
children are born and reared, and in which individuals invest heavily in the 
quality of the parenting they provide. Alexander Kaufman points out that the 
investments parents make cannot really be understood as instances of option 
luck, since caretakers “do not make a calculated gamble in order to secure the 
possibility of a [personal] gain.”105 I may not personally desire to have and 
raise children, but it is in my interest that others do so and do so well, if only 
in order that there will be citizens in the future to sustain society when my 
generation  reaches  old  age.  To  accept  these  substantial  benefits  without 
contributing to their costs, then, is to free ride on the labour of others. It is on 
these grounds that I believe Dworkin’s True-Cost  Principle, if intended to 
avoid  the  exploitative  implications  of  equality  of  welfare,  must  be 
supplemented with something like a ‘True-Benefit Principle.’ If the former 
requires that individuals internalise the costs to others of their choices, the 
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latter suggest the costs associated with benefits to others are appropriately 
externalised.  
 
I propose that the argument for such externalisation might go something like 
the following:  
 
True-Benefits  Principle:  The  costs  to  individuals  of  voluntary 
behaviour  that  issues  diffuse  benefits  to  the  community  are 
appropriately borne by the community  as a whole, where possible. 
(Normative Premise) 
 
The community as a whole benefits when children are cared for in 
such a way that they can participate in and sustain the community. 
The community benefits when this care is provided by an individual 
or individuals identifiable to the child. (Empirical Premise 1) 
 
There are individuals who choose to provide such care, and this care 
is necessarily costly in a number of ways. (Empirical Premise 2) 
 
Therefore, the community as a whole should bear the costs to those 
individuals of providing such care, where possible.  
 
In  this  way  the  distributive  implications  of  justice  as  recognition  become 
clear. In Justice Interruptus Nancy Fraser maintains that relational equality106 
is  undermined  both  through  inequality  in  the  distributive  sphere, 
diminishing agents’ abilities to interact with one another as peers, and in the 
cultural sphere, institutionalising patterns of value regarding what counts as 
a  benefit  to  the  community.107  She  focuses  specifically  on  the  cultural 
devaluation  of  care  work  and  argues  that  relational  equality requires  a 
radical revaluation in both the cultural and distributive spheres.  
                                                 
106 What she terms ‘participatory parity’ – the ability of citizens to participate in a par with 
one another in social life  
107 Fraser, Why Overcoming Prejudice is Not Enough (2000), p24   56 
 
One of the most striking aspects of Fraser’s account is the assertion that care 
work is properly regarded as a duty that falls on everyone, comparable to the 
duty  distributive  theories  like  Dworkin’s  assign  to  capable  individuals  to 
work for the resources they consume. She goes as far as to apply the notion 
of a free-rider, familiar in distributive justice discourse, to the “men of all 
classes who shirk care work and domestic labour, as well as corporations 
who  free-ride  on  the  labour  of  working  people,  both  underpaid  and 
unpaid.”108  Dworkin  wants  us  to  allow  variation  in  valuation  of  people’s 
various  talents  and  ambitions  to  ensure  an  efficient  distribution  and 
incentive  scheme,  but  recognition  points  out  how  these  valuations  are 
already distorted and advises how they should be corrected.  
 
Exploitation is in fact difficult to define purely in terms of the allocation of 
costs and benefits. It is often noted in paradigm exploitation cases, such a 
sweatshop labour, that the exploited party does receive some benefit from 
the exploiter and consensually engages in the exchange under most plausible 
accounts of consent. While Hillel Steiner identifies the unequal value of the 
items  exchanged  as  one    (insufficient)  condition  of  exploitation,109  it  is 
notoriously difficult to compare the value of goods beyond their market 
value, which is itself determined on the basis of the exchanges in wh ich they 
feature. In this way we lack a means of identifying instances of exploitation 
based  on  unequal  exchange  unless  we  develop  an  “objective  measure  of 
costs,”110  which  would  run  contrary  to  the  claim  of  the  unencumbered 
market to be the most efficient means of identifying true costs and benefits.  
 
Hypothetical Insurance as Cost-Externalisation 
 
It  is  not  the  cases,  of  course,  that  all  individual  choices  thought  to  be 
communally  beneficial  really  are.  In  the  interpersonal  context  we  are  all 
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familiar with unsolicited gift situations in which one is offered an alleged 
benefit  voluntarily  by  another,  seemingly  with  no  strings  attached,  who 
subsequently demands that we compensate them for the cost they bore in 
providing  the  benefit  we  did  not  necessarily  even  desire.  Ordinarily  we 
understand this type of case to be exploitative, and insist that the benefiting 
party  must  voluntarily  enter  into  agreement  with  the  one  providing  the 
benefit in order to be liable for the costs. While in diffuse benefit situations 
this principle might be impossible to honour in practice, we must find a way 
to track that ideal inasmuch as is possible in the theoretical underpinnings of 
collective commissioning.  
 
Similarly,  much  of  the  free  market’s  value  lies  in  its  power  to  efficiently 
communicate  a  great deal of information  regarding consumer interests to 
producers. If we accept that this tool is unavailable in cases of diffuse benefit, 
especially when the producers of such benefits are already non-economically 
motivated, we will need an alternative mechanism by which to determine 
and  communicate  the  interests  of  the  community  that  warrant  cost-
externalisation.  
 
It  is  at  this  point  I  believe  hypothetical  insurance  reveals  its  true  value. 
Dworkin  introduces  hypothetical  insurance  as  a  justification  for  the 
externalisation of the costs of brute luck as a means by which to determine 
the terms of that externalisation. I want to argue, however, that brute bad 
luck  is  just  one  category  of  costs  that  would  be  externalised  under  a 
hypothetical  insurance  scheme.  From  the  original  position  we  would  not 
merely insure against certain risks beyond our control; we would also be 
concerned to ensure that various social benefits stemming from individual 
agents’  choices  and  behaviours  would  be  encouraged  and  sustained. 
Furthermore  the  ‘brute  bad  luck’  of  being  excluded  from  the  dominant 
cooperative scheme, we argued above, is more accurately understood as a 
communal and extended choice to trade that inclusion for some efficiency 
gain. In order to be justified, that trade-off must be reasonable to all from the   58 
original position and this will require that those disadvantaged in the pursuit 
of efficiency appropriately share in the benefits it creates.  
   59 
3. Interpersonal Justification and Reasonable 
Expectations 
 
Having  demonstrated  that  resource  and  relational  egalitarianism  are  not 
fundamentally  incompatible,  despite  first  appearances,  it’s  time  now  to 
return to our central idea of reasonableness as an appropriate guide to the 
reach of hypothetical insurance. I argued in my first chapter that Dworkin’s 
theory already implicitly relies on such a criterion in order to distinguish in a 
plausible manner between instances of option and brute luck, and thereby to 
determine the cases to which hypothetical insurance applies. In the second 
chapter I concluded that hypothetical insurance should be understood as a 
means of justifying (either additionally or, on a strict relational egalitarian 
account, solely) the communal bearing of a variety of costs that are traceable 
to choices – both of the community and individual agents. First, I argued that 
the character of many instances of supposed ‘brute bad luck’ is in actuality at 
least  partially  socially  determined  by  the  dominant  cooperative  scheme 
chosen  (in  a  diffuse  way)  by  the  community.  Second,  and  relatedly,  I 
examined a number of ways in which that cooperative scheme depends on 
the communal benefits of some individuals’ voluntary actions.  
 
In both types of case, I argue, the costs associated with the benefits enjoyed 
by the whole community fall initially to individual members. In this chapter I 
want  to  explore  how  rational  agents  would  treat  such  costs  through 
hypothetical insurance – which costs they would leave with the individual 
and which they would choose to bear communally – and defend the thesis 
that such insurance  is a  valid means of meeting the  relational  egalitarian 
requirement of interpersonal justification.     60 
Argument of this Chapter 
Starting  from  Anderson’s  claim  that  relational  justice  “comprises  a  set  of 
interpersonally justifiable claims”111 I first want to explain how I think such 
interpersonal justification relies on the judgments of reasonableness I have 
been  invoking  throughout  this  thesis.  I  will  argue  that  the  counterfactual 
ignorance Dworkin solicits in order to determine the extent of hypothetical 
insurance’s coverage can be understood as a means of ensuring interpersonal 
justifiability. I will then examine the disagreement between Anderson and 
Cohen regarding the relationship between justice, possibility and what it is 
reasonable to expect of agents. This feature, I will suggest, issues a number of 
interesting implications regarding the progressive realisation of justice and 
the extent of hypothetical insurance. 
 
Next I will turn to the relational objection to ‘distributivist’ theories which 
treat distribution patterns as the sole objects of justice appraisal, thereby 
overlooking the justice relevance of the manner in which those distributions 
are brought about. I will endorse the claim that the institutional attitudes 
thereby expressed are of justice concern, as demonstrated by the fact that 
such attitudes cannot be interpersonally justified. I will claim, however, that 
the attitudes expressed by the principles central to resource egalitarianism 
are justified in this light, and that resource egalitarianism does not preclude 
the appraisal of more fine-grained policy proposals on expressive as well as 
distributive grounds.  
 
Finally,  I  will  explore  the  implications  of  understanding  hypothetical 
insurance as a means by which to realise the interpersonal conception of 
justification, and suggest that if relational egalitarians can show that range-
constraints on income inequality are interpersonally justified, hypothetical 
insurance  will  enforce  such  constraints.  Resource  and  relational 
egalitarianism  thereby  face  the  same  challenges  in  applying  the  ideals  of 
relational justice, and should issue the same verdicts.  
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Reasonableness and Interpersonal Justifiability 
 
Dworkin himself, in the  second half of  Sovereign Virtue which applies  his 
resource  egalitarianism  to  concrete  political  issues,  invokes  the  idea  of 
reasonableness  for  determining  the  contours  of  hypothetical  insurance, 
claiming that a community “must ask roughly what level of coverage against 
risks of the character in question would seem reasonable to the majority of 
people  in  the  community.”112  Anderson,  in  her  criticism  of  this  approach, 
claims  that  luck  egalitarianism  abandons  those  who  made  “entirely 
reasonable  […]  choices,”113  and  advocates  basing  our  judgment  of  the 
fundamental capabilities necessary for equal participation in society on what 
“we can reasonably agree to collectively provide.”114  
 
The notion of reasonableness is notoriously resistant to definition and I must 
decline  to  meet  that  challenge  here.  Instead,  I  want  to  argue  that  our 
invocation  of  that  virtue  so  far  throughout  this  thesis  –  in  designating 
reasonable  avoidability,  reasonable  anticipation,  reasonable  alternatives  – 
can  be  understood  as  a  shorthand  for  the  interpersonal  conception  of 
justification central to relational equality. Indeed it seems that this is at least 
one of the uses to which Rawls puts that notion: 
 
“Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, 
they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that 
others will likewise do so.”115  
 
What we can say, I think, is that the condition of reasonableness limits the 
permissible premises of arguments regarding political principles and policies 
to those that can (again, reasonably) be accepted by all other members of the 
community. This condition is not merely required on epistemic grounds but 
on  the  basis  of  respect  for  the  judgment  of  others.  Reasonable  citizens, 
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according to Rawls, “begin deliberations by crediting others with good faith 
reasoning” and recognise that their own judgments “are fallible, and open to 
revision and correction.”116  
 
Cohen and the Interpersonal Test 
We  introduced  in  the  previous  chapter  Cohen’s  interpretation  of 
interpersonal justification as an analysis of the ways in which an argument 
for  a  given  policy  proposal  “changes  its  aspect  when  its  presenter  is  the 
person, or one of the people, whose choice, or choices, make one or more of 
the argument’s premises true.”117 This immediately coheres with Dworkin’s 
treatment of option-luck – an individual who takes a gamble voluntarily in 
the hopes of some personal gain cannot justify interpersonally a demand to 
be  compensated  if  that  gamble  goes  bad,  since  he  himself  makes  the 
empirical premise true, and could have reasonably avoided doing so.  
 
Cohen  was  there  arguing  specifically  against  the  incentives  argument  for 
inequality, which he claimed could not be interpersonally justified since the 
talented, he alleged, make the empirical premise (that they would use those 
talents to everyone’s benefit only under circumstances of inequality in their 
favour) true by choice. We must be careful to note, however, that the mere 
operation  of choice in the  empirical premise is not necessarily enough to 
undermine the justification of such an argument in all cases. The broader 
point is that a policy is interpersonally justified only if the behaviour of the 
relevant agents to which it applies is itself justified.118 It is the justification of 
the talented’s choice to withhold productivity that is missing in the argument 
above, according to Cohen, not that it is a choice per se. So far in this thesis 
we’ve been attending to a variety of individual and community choices that I 
argue are intuitively justified. The question then is how we might codify the 
distinction between justified and unjustified truth-makers of the empirical 
premise in such arguments.  
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The Contours of Justice – Reasonableness, Ought and Can 
Cohen  and  Anderson,  while  both  endorsing  interpersonal  justification  as 
central to the legitimacy of any distributive scheme, disagree fundamentally 
on the standard to which individual agents can be held. Anderson argues that 
Cohen’s  interpretation  of  interpersonal  justification  is  unreasonably 
demanding  of  individual  citizens  and  that  in  making  such  unreasonable 
demands  Cohen  reveals  his  underlying  consequentialist  commitment, 
thereby dissenting from relational egalitarianism.  
 
This  disagreement  between  Anderson  and  Cohen  is  illustrated  in  their 
conflicting interpretations of Rawls’ Difference Principle, though it’s root is 
much deeper such that we should expect similar disagreement to arise in 
relation to any principle of social justice. Cohen’s objection to the Difference 
Principle can be traced to his contention that the basic structures of society, 
to  which  Rawls’  principles  of  justice  apply,  cannot  be  meaningfully 
distinguished  from  the  behaviours  of  individual  citizens  that  uphold  such 
structures, so if justice requirements apply to the former they therefore must 
also apply to the latter.119 In this way citizens must themselves act from the 
principles and values of justice, not merely maximise their own self -interest 
while obeying the rules of an institutional scheme understood   to aim at 
justice on their behalf. Cohen readily concedes that such a requirement may 
indeed be so onerous as to render justice impossible under some given 
conditions, and in such cases we must settle for “the best injustice we can 
get.”120 
 
Anderson,  by  contrast,  argues  that  the  interpersonal  conception  of 
justification  itself  constrains  justice  requirements  to  what  can,  in  fact,  be 
realised.  Justice,  on  that  account,  cannot  be  defined  “except  through  the 
concept of agents’ compliance with reasonable claims people may make on 
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each other,”121 and “[i]t is unreasonable to demand of agents that they satisfy 
a  principle  they  are  unable  to  follow.”122  One  resulting  constraint  on 
reasonable claims, Anderson alleges, is that they allow room for what Samuel 
Scheffler calls an ‘agent-centred prerogative’123 – that they allow agents to 
pursue their own values and projects, not merely aim only ever at justice.124  
 
How does this quarrel apply to resource egalitarianism? I believe Dworkin 
would agree with Anderson that justice cannot require what cannot be done 
– the parameters of justice, he argues, include “the overall state of the world’s 
resources”125 and so he would disagree with Cohen’s contention that justice 
is sometimes unattainable on scarcity grounds.126 But it is not immediately 
obvious that Dworkin would similarly accept the agent -centred prerogative 
as a genuine viability restriction. 
 
The Agent-Centred Prerogative and True Costs 
Seana Shiffrin suggests that there is  value  in cost-externalisation  in some 
cases  in  order  to  protect  the  social  conditions  of  freedom,  arguing  that 
egalitarianism  must  “temper  choice-sensitive  measures  of  resource 
distribution with accommodation, that is social practices in which we absorb 
some of the costs of others’ free, morally relevant choices.”127 The costs she 
proposes as appropriately externalised, I believe, fall into at least two broad 
categories – collective commissioning and agent-centred prerogatives.  
 
On  the  one  hand,  Shiffrin  argues  for  the  accommodation  of  moral 
supererogatory acts such as care work. She suggests, for example, that the 
communal bearing or mitigation of the costs of choosing to care for children 
and other dependents might be justified on ‘public goods’ grounds, since such 
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choices  “make  possible  the  community’s  continued  existence  and 
flourishing.”128 This proposal reads just as collective commissioning set out 
in a different vocabulary.129  
 
On the other had, she argues that the freedom from personally bearing 
certain costs of one’s choices is valuable because it offers “the opportunity to 
engage with a particular value, in some degree of isolation, to determine its 
significance  to  oneself  and  to  respond  appropriately  to  the  reasons  it 
presents.”130  But  how  are  we  to  determine  the  cases  to  which  such 
accommodations apply? Surely the Malibu surfers131 would argue that their 
choice of lifestyle and evaluation of the transcendental experience of riding 
the  perfect  wave  should  be  isolated  from  such  base  and  materialistic 
concerns as their economic contribution. To avoid rampant per missiveness, 
which  would  undermine  cost -internalisation  and  personal  responsibility 
altogether, Shiffrin would need to make decidedly anti -liberal judgments 
regarding the choices subject to her accommodation. This point is illustrated 
when  we  consider  the  realities  of  her  paradigm  case  of  religious 
accommodation, which requires states to discriminate between established 
and novel, or particularly expensive, religions. 
 
One  of  the  strengths  of  resource  egalitarianism  and  the  hypothetical 
insurance  scheme,  I  believe,  is  that  it  dispenses  with  the  need  for  an 
independent  and  competing  agent -centred  prerogative.  The  True -Cost 
Principle gives agents free reign to pursue their own projects and interests so 
long as they cover the costs to others of those pursuits. Anderson argues that 
relational equality requires that agents be allowed to enjoy “within a wide 
range, real freedom to lead their own lives according to their own judgments, 
without  having  to  receive  permission  from  others,  justify  the  ideals  and 
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priorities they adopt to others, or submit to others’ moralizing scrutiny.”132 
While  that  may  indeed  be  so,  relational  equality  also  fundamentally  tells 
against exploitation or “the social processes that bring about a transfer of 
energies from one group to another to produce unequal distributions [under 
which] social institutions enable a few to accumulate while they constrain 
many more.”133 If relational egalitarianism is to effectively guard against this 
type of subordination it must employ some means by which to judge when 
the communal bearing of costs is fair and unfair. To say that individuals must 
be allowed to pursue their own ends without, at least in theory, being able to 
justify the costs to others of that pursuit surely violates the interpersonal 
conception of justification.  
 
Privacy 
Of  course  there  may  be  interpersonally  justifiable  reasons  to  resist  such 
demands  for  justification  in  practice.  Anderson  objects  to  the  ‘demeaning 
judgments’  she  supposes  to  be  required  by  the  True-Cost  Principle  to 
distinguish  between  those  who  genuinely  cannot  support  themselves 
through  lack  of  marketable  talent,  and  those  who  instead  choose  not  to 
contribute. She claims that, in the former case, one would have to “display 
evidence  of  personal  inferiority”134  to  access  one’s  entitlement  to 
compensation,  which  would  be  inherently  demeaning.  Wolff  expands  this 
worry by considering the specific example of one “who is unemployed at a 
time of low unemployment and no particular shortage of jobs,”135 claiming 
that the individual would have to convince others that they genuinely lack 
the option to work, even when the opportunity is plainly open to others in 
similar external circumstances - he would have to make ‘shameful revelations’ 
about  himself. Shiffrin similarly worries that “[v]ery thorough schemes of 
choice-sensitivity [would] involve the collection and possession of detailed 
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information about individuals by others,”136 which may undermine the spirit 
of relational equality and potentially place individuals at risk of exploitative 
relationships.  Even  worse,  Anderson  claims,  such  a  scheme  would  give 
everyone “an incentive to deny personal responsibility for their problems 
and to represent their situation as one in which they were helpless before 
uncontrollable forces.”137  
 
These contingent implementation difficulties may very well limit the extent 
to which we are able to realise the True-Cost Principle in practice. If Dworkin 
does indeed agree with Anderson that the dictates of justice are contingent 
upon  the  brute  luck  of  what  is  genuinely  possible,  the  difficulties  she 
highlights  in  determining  responsibility  for  an  individual’s  lack  of  wealth 
talents will similarly impose a restriction upon what we can require of one 
another on justice grounds.  
 
Expressive Violations of Relational Equality 
 
Of course the distributive implications of a given policy constitute only one 
aspect of our concern when we demand that it be interpersonally justified. 
Relational egalitarians object to purely distributive approaches to justice on 
the grounds that they  fail to recognise the moral relevance of the  way in 
which those distributions come about.138  
 
To illustrate this relevance, Pogge offers a number of different scenarios 
under  which  a  given  portion  of  the  population  might  suffer  a  medical 
condition due to the avoidable lack of some vital nutrient.  This nutritional 
deficit might (1) be officially mandated by the reigning social and political 
institutions; or (2) result from the legally authorized behaviour of private 
citizens; (3) be engendered avoidably and  foreseeably by the institutions 
themselves  without  being  their  aim;  (4)  result  from  private  citizens’ 
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behaviour that is technically legally prohibited but allowed to continue in 
practice; (5) result from a natural deficit whose effects are left unmitigated; 
or (6) be self-caused and left unmitigated by social institutions.139 In each 
case the distributive result is the same, but Pogge suggests that our intuitions 
regarding justice vary from case to case  –  specifically  that  the  first  case 
strikes us as the most egregious injustice of the list, with the rest roughly 
descending in order of their intuitive injustice. If Pogge’s intuitions hold up it 
seems to show that, while the presence or absence of the affected individual’s 
responsibility  for  her  situation  is  important  in  determining  its  justice 
standing, it is not  the only relevant  factor. The  comparative  role of other 
citizens, individually or collectively through social institutions, and natural 
factors  in  engendering  that  outcome  also  have  a  part  to  play  in  our 
judgments.  
 
Schemmel agrees with Pogge’s intuitive ordering, and attempts to elucidate 
its  grounds.  Our  first  thought,  he  suggests,  might  be  that  these  justice 
intuitions  simply  track  the  causal  differences  between  the  different 
scenarios.140  The deficit in scenario 6 is traceable, by hypothesis, to the 
deficit-sufferer himself. In scenario 5, by contrast, the deficit is attributed to 
natural factors. Scenarios 1-4, then, are of intuitively greater justice concern 
due to the causal role played by social institutions. Both Pogge and Schemmel 
argue,  however,  that  part,  at  least,  of  what  concerns  us  from  a  justice 
perspective in scenarios 1-4 are the attitudes expressed by the institutions in 
question  toward  the  deficit-sufferers,  and  that  this  is  not  reducible  to 
distributive  concerns.141  For  an  institution  to  act  with  the  appropriate 
attitude,  Schemmel  alleges,  is  for  it  to  “take  the  right  considerations  as 
reasons for actions” regarding the object of those actions.142 An institution 
treats a set of individuals unjustly in its expressive attitude toward them if it 
fails to appropriately modify its actions in light of their probable effects on 
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those  individuals  even if  those  effects do not  in fact manifest.143  It is this 
feature  of  our  justice  intuitions  that  seems   to  show  our  concern  for 
expressive attitudes wholly independently of costs and effects.  
 
Institutional Attitudes and the Interpersonal Test 
Dworkin’s is not a purely distributivist approach, I have been arguing. The 
distinctive feature of resource egalitarianism is its focus on responsibility for 
distributions,  and  in  this  way  it  similarly  treats  identical  distributions 
differently  depending  on  the  manner  in  which  they  come  about.  Can  this 
responsibility  concern  be  understood  in  terms  of  expressive  attitudes? 
Dworkin certainly intends that his scheme should “show equal concern for 
all”144 and claims that it does so by adhering to the True-Cost Principle. The 
individual himself is responsible for the deficit in scenario 6 and as such, 
Dworkin claims, the costs of his bad option luck appropriately rest with him. 
In scenario 5 it is alleged that the deficit is the result of a natural defect and 
so would count, under Dworkin’s scheme, as an instance of brute bad luck. 
Scenarios  1-4  involve  societal  and  institutional  responsibility  for  the 
individual’s  disadvantage  to  varying  degrees.  The  justice-ordering  in  the 
latter  set  similarly  seems  to  track  Dworkin’s  criteria  for  responsibility  as 
introduced in his definition of option luck. For instance, the deficit in scenario 
1  is  highly  foreseeable  and  avoidable,  and  there  are  obvious  reasonable 
alternatives available, while in scenario 3, perhaps, it is less obvious what a 
reasonable  alternative  might  be  given  that  an  alternative  institutional 
structure  might  itself  engender  similar  deficits  in  other  sections  of  the 
population.   
 
How might these scenarios fare under the interpersonal test? Surely scenario 
1 strikes us as the most egregiously unjust because the policy of officially 
mandating the deficit could not possibly be interpersonally justified to those 
targeted. To enforce such a policy despite failing the interpersonal test would 
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be  to  treat  those  it  disadvantages  as  outside  of  the  justificatory 
community,145 as people to whom such policies do not need to be justified. In 
this way failing to meet the interpersonal test is unjust because it expresses a 
lack of relational equality, independent of any potential distributive injustice. 
Cohen emphasises the importance of relational equality beyond its mere 
distributive implications, pointing out that:  
 
“[i]t is not necessarily irrational (and it is sometimes felt to be morally 
imperative) to refuse to deal with a person who wields power in an 
untoward way even if, should you accede to the proposal he makes, 
you would be materially better off.”146 
 
Marginalised populations, for instance, often rebuke members who are seen 
to have ‘sold out’ the community by accepting material or social benefits on 
terms that are not justifiable to that community. The other three scenarios of 
relationally  engendered  deficits  perhaps  intuitively  seem  somewhat  less 
obviously unjust insofar as there is a greater possibility in each case that the 
policy in question would be interpersonally justified. It might be the case, for 
example, that guarding against the deficit under scenario 4 would require an 
invasion  of  privacy  even  those  disadvantaged  by  the  policy  would  not 
endorse.  
 
Resource  and  relational  egalitarians  will  agree  with  one  another  that 
scenario  6  is  of  least  justice  concern  since  it  would  be  difficult  to 
interpersonally justify a communal bearing of the costs of the deficit when 
that  deficit  is  the  result  of  the  sufferers’  own  behaviour  (though  not 
impossible, I have  been  arguing, if that behaviour is  itself interpersonally 
justified).  The  justice  standing  of  scenario  5,  then,  is  the  real  point  of 
contention between the two approaches. Yet as I argued in the last chapter, 
the social context of brute luck is of concern to both relational and resource 
egalitarians,  and  “avoidably  leaving  unmitigated  the  effects  of  a  natural 
defect”147 will be just only if such a policy can be interpersonally justified 
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both to those affected by the natural defect and those who would pay for its 
mitigation.  
 
The Interpersonal Justifiability of Forward-Looking 
Responsibility Guarantees 
 
Finally,  then,  we  can  investigate  whether  relational  and  resource 
egalitarianism,  under  my  interpretation,  are  likely  to  converge  in  their 
judgments  regarding  the  safeguarding  of  the  conditions  of  personal 
responsibility.  
 
In “How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?” Anderson refines her 
critique of luck egalitarianism and elucidates the ways in which she believes 
markets  can  justly  impact  outcomes  while  remaining  true  to  relational 
equality. There she argues that markets must be permitted to reflect luck in 
order that they might function efficiently in communicating and responding 
to the various interests people have within the community.148 Without this 
chance-sensitive  (and  desert -insensitive)  mechanism  individuals  cannot 
respond  accurately  to  the  interests  of  others.  The  question  relational 
egalitarians face, then, is how to allow the market to operate efficiently while 
ensuring  the  costs  of  that  efficiency  do  not  fall  disproportionately  and 
unjustly to some individuals or g roups. Anderson argues that the correct 
solution is to impose ‘range-constraints’ which compress the signal range of 
markets  “without  degrading  the  signal  quality.”149  Can  this  relational 
egalitarian  requirement  be  justified  interpersonally,  and  thereby 
incorporated into the hypothetical insurance scheme?  
 
I see Anderson’s proposal as open to interpretation in one of at least two 
ways. First, she may be read as simply continuing to fill in the justification for 
her  claim  in  ‘What  is  the  Point  of  Equality?’  that  her  democratic  equality 
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theory  of  distributive  justice  “guarantees  all  law-abiding  citizens  effective 
access to the social conditions of their freedom at all times.”150 According to 
Anderson, democratic equality retains respect for personal responsibility by 
limiting the sphere of capabilities with which it concerns itself. While luck 
egalitarianism  must  make  intrusive  judgments  in  order  to  distinguish 
between losses which the individual brings upon himself and losses which 
are  traceable  to  brute  bad  luck,  democratic  equality  “guarantees  a  set  of 
capabilities necessary to functioning as a free and equal citizen and avoiding 
oppression”151 while leaving all other losses, whether through bad luck or 
imprudence,  up  to  the  individual.  Under  that  reading,  range-constraints 
would include certain capability-access guarantees based on a fundamental 
concern  for  relational  equality,  regardless  of  the  reason  for  the  loss  of 
capability-access  (barring,  perhaps,  illegal  behaviour).  Call  this  the 
Unconditional Guarantee.  
 
On  a  second  reading,  Anderson  might  be  targeting  ‘bad  market  luck’ 
specifically. This would suggest a more circumspect capabilities guarantee, 
justified  by  reference  to  the  moral  irrelevance  of  market  luck.  While 
“[e]fficient  market  prices  are  necessarily  undeserved”152  and  therefore 
individuals  cannot  be  held  (fully)  responsible  for  loss  of  access  to  basic 
capabilities through bad market luck, there are other ways in which one can 
lose such access – for example, by fecklessly choosing to spend all one’s time 
surfing  rather  than  earning  a  living  through  the  performance  of  socially 
useful tasks. To the extent that becoming destitute through such behaviour is 
non-attributable  to  market  luck  these  situations  may  not  be  covered  by 
Anderson’s proposed range-constraints.  Call this the Conditional Guarantee. 
 
Unconditional  guarantees  of  all  stripes  inevitably  face  the  exploitation 
objection – that such guarantees are unfair because they allow “people to live 
off the labour of their fellow citizens without making a reciprocal productive 
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contribution  to  society.”153  Anderson  herself  objects  to  Van  Parijs’ 
unconditional basic income proposal precisely on the grounds that it “invites 
the  charge  that  egalitarians  support  irresponsibility  and  encourage  the 
slothful to be parasitic on the productive.”154 Yet not all arrangements under 
which  some  benefit  unilaterally  from  the  labour  of  others  are  intuitively 
unfair.  As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  most  of  us  recognise  an 
obligation to support those with disabilities who cannot make a reciprocal 
productive contribution – either because their impairments are so extensive 
as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  contribution,  or  because  the  dominant 
cooperative  scheme  excludes  the  abilities  they  do  have.  Cohen  similarly 
identifies as exploitative situations in which “other people pay for [one’s] 
readily  avoidable  wastefulness,”155  or  inefficiency  in  converting  resources 
into welfare, but distinguishes these from blamelessly inefficient converters. 
 
Wealth Talents and Hypothetical Unemployment Insurance 
Dworkin’s hypothetical unemployment insurance, I believe, converges at the 
very  least  with  Anderson’s  Conditional  Guarantee,  given  that  the  roles  of 
effort  and  luck  in  earning  power  are  almost  impossible  to  distinguish 
epistemically in any given case. He claims that there are two demands of 
equality relevant to such cases pulling in opposing directions: 
 
“Equality requires that those who choose more expensive ways to live 
- which includes choosing less productive occupations measured by 
what others want - have less residual income in consequence. But it 
also requires that no one have less income simply in consequence of 
less native talent.”156 
 
Here he draws a connection between a lack of “wealth-talents”, or “talents to 
produce  what  people  actually  want,”157  and  disability,  since  one’s  native 
talent is a matter of brute luck. Dworkin’s conception of wealth talents in fact 
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aligns largely with the social model of disability discussed above – he claims 
that those whose talents do not command a high market wage are “in no way 
[…] intrinsically less talented people, than income millionaires,” and points to 
the contingencies of the market in determining the recent demand for “the 
ability to cause a leather ball to fall through a distant hoop”158 as illustrative 
of  the  disconnect  between  market  value  and  any  objective  measure.  The 
True-Cost Principle, however, requires that such contingencies as the tastes 
of others be allowed to shape our ambitions, so a balance must be struck 
between  spreading  the  costs  of  brute  bad  luck  in  native  talents,  and 
maintaining the role of personal responsibility in determining whether and 
which talents to develop based on that decision’s cost to the community.  
 
Again,  Dworkin  invokes  the  hypothetical  insurance  device  to  resolve  this 
tension.  He  imagines  that  in  the  original  position  one  knows  one’s  own 
talents but not their ‘economic rent’, or what income they would produce on 
the  market.159  A rational agent would then chose an insurance package 
against the risk of that economic  rent dropping below a certain level, and 
Dworkin argues that the level chosen would vary from person to person, but 
fall into a determinate band. At the upper end, it would be irrational for the 
individual to insure at a very high level since any unemploym ent insurance 
will necessarily be a disadvantageous gamble in purely financial terms  - the 
operational costs alone would require that premiums exceed pay -outs. It is 
the  fact  of  marginal  utility,  that  increased  resources  buy  less  and  less 
utility/welfare  further  up  the  scale,  that  renders  such  disadvantageous 
gambles rational.160  
 
“Unemployment  insurance  makes  sense,  therefore,  only  when  it 
protects, not just against having less wealth than one otherwise might, 
but against being in such a significantly worse position that it is worth 
a technically bad investment to avoid any chance of it.”161 
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In this way the band of rational income levels to insure for depends on the 
spread of individual marginal utility preferences. Since the decision of how 
much insurance to buy cannot in fact be made individually since in the real 
world we do have at least some idea of the economic rent of our talents, this 
insurance will have to be hypothetical and apply equally to everyone. It is 
therefore subject to the same public discourse of interpersonal justifiability 
as  those  hypothetical  decisions  regarding  disability  and  the  communal 
benefits of individual behaviours. Dworkin believes, however, that we would 
agree  to  “provide  everyone  with  at  least  a  decent  minimum  standard  of 
living.”162 
 
Dworkin thereby endorses at least some sort of safety net regarding how low 
citizens are allowed to fall in terms of their material holdings. Anderson also 
argues, however, that we should similarly demand a limit on inequality at the 
upper  end  of  the  wealth  spectrum.  While  Dworkin  rules  out  social 
domination on prejudicial grounds through the Principle of Independence we 
might still expect that economic domination, through economic inequality, 
would arise and proliferate under his scheme. Anderson points out that the 
relatively poorer party would not necessarily need to be especially poor in 
absolute terms for domination to emerge through economic inequality - “well 
before material conditions fall to the point of absolute suffering, bad market 
luck may subject individuals to subordinating or exploitative relationships, or 
impair  their  ability  to  participate  as  an  equal  in  public  affairs.”163  Is  it 
consistent with Dworkin’s theory that this type of domination be permitted 
to arise through optional gambles? His Principle of Special Responsibility is 
motivated by the demand that individuals appropriately control the course of 
their  own  lives.164  Option  luck  is  taken  to  justly  influence  an  individual’s 
outcomes  because  the  risks  are  taken  voluntarily,  in  isolation  and  with 
appropriate  knowledge  of  the  possible  results.  Yet  in  situations  of 
domination, one party is forced to risk and forfeit important capabilities by 
another.  We  cannot  ensure  that  individual  citizens  are  able  to  take 
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responsibility for their own  choices  without  guarding against  domination, 
and this requires undermining the bases of economic domination. How might 
this  type  of  constraint  be  justified  interpersonally,  and  enforced  through 
hypothetical insurance?  
 
Exploitation and the Bargaining Problem 
Matthew  Seligman  highlights  the  way  in  which  luck  egalitarianism,  by 
endorsing  economic  inequalities  as  just  once  they  arise  through  its 
designated procedure, can lead to exploitation by examining what he terms  
‘the bargaining problem’. Here bad luck is compounded by factors outside of 
one’s control, which are nonetheless treated as just by luck egalitarians since 
they  are  attributable  to  someone’s  choice.165  His  specific  example  again 
involves  a  shipwrecked  group  of  equally  naturally  talented  individual s, 
possessing equally distributed resources. From that starting position most 
opt for a safe bet of fishing in shallow waters, which leaves them with paltry 
food stores, while one, Gates, takes a much greater risk which pays off when 
he catches a whale. This inequality is perfectly just from a luck egalitarian 
perspective, but now Gates and the others have unequal bargaining positions 
such that Gates has  leverage over the others. He then uses this position to 
propose a deal heavily slanted in his favour, which the others rationally must 
accept out of desperation. While, by hypothesis, the deal is freely consented 
to by all parties, Seligman supposes that it, and the resultant exacerbation of 
resource inequality, will strike us as intuitively unjust. Yet luck egalitarianism 
cannot account for why it should be so.166  
 
Does this problem similarly affect resource egalitarianism? Seligman defines 
his main target as the principle that “[i]nequalities, or parts thereof, are just if 
and only if they are traceable to choice, rather than chance.”167 While it is 
crucial  to  Dworkin’s  theory  that  option  luck  (i.e.  the  voluntarily  accepted 
influence of chance) be permitted to influence distributions, it is the chosen 
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nature of those gambles that legitimates their impact.168 In this way we might 
expect the bargaining problem to apply. According to resource egalitarianism 
the  shipwreck  survivors’  fortunes  are  attributable  to  option  luck  in  the 
fishing strategies they chose. Gates takes a greater gamble than the others, 
risking the entirety of his initial resource share, as well as his life, in the 
hopes of winning big. The other survivors have as much claim to the whale he 
catches as they would have responsibility to help Gates if his gamble had 
turned  out  badly.  But  resource  egalitarianism  departs  from  luck 
egalitarianism here in that that responsibility is non-zero. To discover what 
claims the survivors have on each others’ differential luck we must identify 
the  hypothetical  insurance  scheme  to  which  they  would  have  rationally 
assented.  
 
In the first chapter I argued that, when an agent is forced to make a choice 
between gambles, the result of the most prudent gamble should be regarded 
as  an  instance  of  brute  luck  and  accordingly  subject  to  hypothetical 
insurance,  and  that  when  an  agent  chooses  a  more  risky  strategy  he  is 
responsible for only those costs and benefits beyond what might have been 
reasonably  anticipated  under  the  most  prudent  option.  Presume  for 
simplicity’s sake, then, that there are only two options available to any one 
survivor, that these options are equally available to all, and there are no more 
fine-grained decisions to be made within either strategy regarding time or 
effort spent at the task. The safe bet is presumed to be to fish with spears in 
the  shallow  waters  near  the  shore;  the  risky  option  is  to  use  all  of  one’s 
resources to fashion a raft to venture into deeper, more treacherous waters. 
If one must choose one or the other to survive, then it is more accurate to 
regard the results of the safe bet for any one individual as a matter of brute 
luck. For that reason justice requires that the effects of luck be equalized 
between those who choose the prudent strategy. In practice this would most 
simply mean pooling and dividing equally their spoils. Gates then chooses the 
riskier  strategy.  He  judges  the  risks  of  death,  injury,  loss  of  his  initial 
resources or simple failure to catch anything at all to be worth accepting for 
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the potential of a great payoff. In choosing that route, does Gates thereby 
forfeit his claim to hypothetical insurance?  
 
One possibility is that the survivors agree in some democratic fashion that 
fishing the deeper waters might be a good idea worth trying, and collectively 
commission Gates to be the first to attempt (being the bravest and most risk-
embracing of the group). After all they don’t know for sure, let’s presume, 
precisely how risky or potentially worthwhile that strategy might be. Gates 
cannot be compensated if he drowns so that’s a risk he must bear himself, but 
the other survivors agree to feed him if he comes back empty-handed, and 
replace his stock of driftwood with which to make spears for shallow-water 
fishing if his raft sinks. If Gates then catches the whale all the survivors are 
entitled to portions of the spoils since the risk was shared (though he may 
deserve a greater portion since he did risk his life alone). That is the case 
even if they do not materially contribute to the endeavour as it happens – it is 
enough that they promised to come to Gates’ aid if the gamble went bad.  
 
It’s not just the whale meat the survivors gain from this communal gamble, 
however. They also learn more than they otherwise could have about the 
risks and benefits involved and so, in this case, increase everyone’s capacity 
to  make  decisions  for  which  they  can  legitimately  be  held  personally 
responsible. It’s possible, for instance, that the whole community learns from 
Gates’ experiment that the deep-water fishing strategy is actually the more 
prudent option on balance. In this way the survivors all have an interest on 
autonomy grounds in Gates taking the risk, and so it would make sense for 
them to communally commission his endeavour.   
 
The  argument  for  externalising  the  costs  of  such  a  gamble  might  go  as 
follows:  
 
True-Benefits  Principle:  The  costs  to  individuals  of  voluntary 
behaviour  that  issues  diffuse  benefits  to  the  community  are   79 
appropriately borne by the community as a whole, where possible. 
(Normative Premise) 
 
The community as a whole benefits when individual agents explore a 
variety of avenues of productive activity. (Empirical Premise 1) 
 
There are individuals who choose to perform such exploration, and 
that exploration is often risky. (Empirical Premise 2) 
 
Therefore, the community as a whole should bear the risks attending 
such exploration, where possible.  
 
We might imagine, then, that the survivors in the original position would 
endorse a hypothetical insurance scheme that would cover the majority of 
risks run by the individual in taking a communally beneficial gamble of this 
type. Financing such an extensive guarantee would surely require much of 
the potential gains of the gamble to be reabsorbed by the community, but this 
requirement  would  be  interpersonally  justifiable  to  Gates  since  he  is  not 
coerced into taking any risks, and the risk he does choose to take is mitigated 
inasmuch as is possible. 
 
Imprudent Gambles 
What should we say, however, of cases in which the first empirical premise 
does not obtain, where the community would not benefit from individuals 
taking a given risk or set of risks, and therefore would not commission such 
behaviour?  In that type of case hypothetical insurance would not indemnify 
the risk-taker against the potential losses and they would therefore claim 
sole entitlement to the potential benefits. If the gamble then does, in fact, pay 
off  Seligman’s  concern  regarding  unequal  bargaining  positions  will  be 
realised.  
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Let’s imagine first that Gates survived but returned empty-handed, or badly 
injured. Everyone agrees on that basis that the deep-water fishing strategy is 
a bad one, and furthermore new techniques of shallow-water fishing actually 
yield enough food for all to subsist on. Another survivor, Gill, ill-advisedly 
decides to try her hand at deep-water fishing since she loves the taste of 
whale  and the  thrill of such a  dangerous occupation. The  other survivors 
have no interest in commissioning her to take that risk, however, since they 
reasonably judge that there is little to be gained having already explored that 
avenue  of  action  through  Gates.  Such  a  gamble  would  be  in  this  way 
analogous to the waiter with an expensive taste for poisonous berries we 
encountered in the first chapter.  
 
There are at least two ways in which this type of imprudent gamble might 
lead to inequality objectionable from a relational egalitarian perspective. In 
the first case, Gill’s gamble might go badly such that she loses the resources 
or physical capabilities necessary to function as an equal in society, thereby 
rendering her vulnerable to subjection and exploitation. In the second case, 
her gamble may work out such that she gains a large economic advantage 
over the other survivors and thereby the unequal bargaining position that 
gives rise to Seligman’s relational concerns. Seligman suggests that in this 
second instance “[t]he problem with the survivors’ bargaining position was 
not that [their] option set was externally determined, but that the options 
open to them were systematically unattractive,”169 and argues that there is 
no  way for a  luck egalitarian to  incorporate the  moral  significance of the 
content of option-sets into their theory, dependent as it is solely upon the 
choice/chance  distinction.  We  have  been  arguing,  however,  that  resource 
egalitarianism  departs  from  traditional  luck  egalitarian  approaches  in  its 
inclusion of the hypothetical insurance scheme. If that scheme can justify the 
guarantee  of  the  capabilities  required  for  relational  equality,  then,  the 
adequacy  of  the  option  sets  of  all  parties  to  subsequent  bargains  will  be 
protected.   
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Compulsory Insurance 
I  argued  in  the  first  chapter  that  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  expect  the 
community to bear the costs of a plainly imprudent gamble, which is to say 
that a policy of indemnifying individuals against consequent losses would not 
be  interpersonally  justifiable  and  therefore  would  not  form  part  of  the 
hypothetical insurance scheme. Rather, it is up to the individual to either 
refrain  from  indulging  the  taste  for  such  gambles,  or  personally  bear  the 
costs if the gamble goes bad.  
 
One way of bearing the costs of that gamble would be to pool the risk with 
others possessed of the same expensive taste through an elective insurance 
scheme.  Indeed,  I  claimed  in  that  first  chapter,  the  community  may  be 
justified in requiring those who indulge these risky tastes to purchase such 
insurance in advance, in order to ensure that no one avoidably falls below 
some threshold of basic capabilities. This threshold is determined by those 
capabilities necessary for relational equality, which is to say, the capabilities 
required  for  exercising  truly  responsible  choice.  Dworkin  justified  his 
hypothetical unemployment insurance scheme above on the basis that it is 
rational  for  agents  to  make  what  is,  in  purely  financial  terms,  a  bad 
investment in order to avoid any chance of finding oneself in a significantly 
bad position. This aligns with our interpretation in the first chapter of his 
‘reasonable isolation of risk’ criterion for option luck as requiring that there 
exist  a  viable  ‘not  thoroughly  bad’  alternative.  Our  resource  egalitarian 
concern to honour the value of personal responsibility, however, suggests 
that we should understand the notion of a ‘significantly bad’ or ‘thoroughly 
bad’ option not directly in material terms, but rather in terms of the potential 
one has or lacks to exercise responsibility. It is on this basis that I believe 
resource egalitarianism, when understood as a means of applying relational 
equality in the distributive realm, will include a forward-looking conception 
of responsibility and not merely a backward-looking one.  
 
In this way the survivors in Seligman’s thought experiment might similarly 
require Gill to pay a premium to cover at least some of the risks attending her   82 
decision to indulge her desire for whale-hunting. But we noted in that first 
chapter that requiring an agent to purchase such insurance against the risks 
attending  elective  gambles  faces  the  charge  of  paternalism.  Anderson,  for 
example,  argues  that  forcing  individuals  to  purchase  such  insurance 
expresses a judgment that citizens are be “too stupid”  to make their own 
decisions.170 Yet she herself expresses support for ex ante insurance to cover 
the costs of restoring fundamental capabilities to those who might lose them 
through imprudent behaviour, proposing something like hazard taxation to 
subsidise  the  greater  demand.171  The  draw  of  compulsory  insurance  is 
seemingly undeniable, and so we might surmise that agents in the original 
position would similarly endorse such a scheme. They may indeed be wary of 
its paternalistic implications, but judge that, on  balance, safeguarding the 
capabilities required to relate to one another on an equitable basis justifies 
such intrusion.   
 
What do we mean by guaranteed access to these capabilities? Wolff highlights 
the way in which, for an agent to realise a capability, they must themselves 
perform some action, which, as we have seen throughout this thesis, is to 
accept some cost or risk. He suggests that identifying what actions are fair to 
expect the agent to perform in order to access a given capability depends 
upon: 
 
 “[…] whether it is reasonable for [that agent] to act one way rather 
than another. Whether it is reasonable will, in turn, depend on the 
potential  impact  on  the  person  and  others  of  their  not  acting  in  a 
particular way […] Hence the relevant notion of reasonableness is that 
of interpersonal justifiability, rather than prudential reason.”172 
 
Anderson  similarly describes  democratic  equality as  guaranteeing citizens 
effective access to the functionings necessary to relate on equitable terms 
with one another, and clarifies that “[f]or those capable of working and with 
access to jobs, the actual achievement of these functionings is, in the normal 
                                                 
170 Anderson (1999), p330 
171 Anderson (1999), p328-9 
172 Wolff, ‘Disability among Equals’ (2009), p117-8   83 
case,  conditional  on  participating  in  the  productive  system.”173  It  is  not 
perfectly clear, however, precisely which capabilities are guaranteed to all 
regardless  of  individual  conduct  and  capacity.  Anderson  clarifies  that 
“democratic  equality  can  make  access  to  certain  functionings  -  those 
requiring  an  income  -  conditional  upon  working  for  them,  provided  that 
citizens have effective access to those conditions”.174 Democratic equality will 
therefore still surely require some means by which to test citizens’ ability to 
work for those functionings, investigating whether the individual genuinely 
has  access  to  work  that  does  not  conflict  with  other  duties;  is  physically 
capable, etc. Anderson voices discontent with the luck egalitarian literature’s 
focus  on  ‘beach  bums’,  but  it  is  hard  to  evaluate  her  proposal  without 
knowing how it would guarantee the fundamental capabilities of those able 
to work who chose instead to devote their lives to leisure and hedonism. 
Here, then, the problems of privacy and security return. We argued above 
that  such  concerns  may  legitimately  constrain  the  reach  of  the  True-Cost 
Principle if they pass the interpersonal test, that is, if everyone can agree 
from the original position, in ignorance of where their abilities, talents and 
ambitions  will place them on  the income  scale, that  they would prefer to 
insure their access to the capabilities fundamental to relational equality at 
such  a  level  that  would  dispose  with  the  need  for  intrusive  judgments 
regarding their genuine access to those capabilities.  
 
Similarly, whether range-constraints are to be imposed at the upper end of 
the wealth scale depends on citizens’ hypothetical insurance judgements and 
rational  trade-offs  between  the  benefits  of  superfluous  wealth  and  the 
attendant  risks  of  such  wealth  inequality  undermining  the  conditions  of 
relational  equality.  Schemmel  points  out,  for  instance,  that  there  are  a 
number of measures that can be employed in society to guard against the 
deleterious  relational  impacts  of  distributive  inequality,  and  argues  that 
constraining its extent is likely to be the most effective given the inordinate 
difficulty  of  restraining  economic  power’s  transformation  into  social  and 
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political power.175 These are empirical questions however, and adherence to 
the True-Cost Principle requires a continual and consistent openness to new 
information from all quarters regarding what the true costs of a given policy 
might actually be.  
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Conclusion 
 
My central claim in this thesis has been that resource egalitarianism is not 
necessarily antithetical to relational justice, but can be instead understood as 
a  means  by  which  to  apply  that  conception  of  justice  in  the  distributive 
sphere.  I  argued  that  hypothetical  insurance  should  be  understood  as  a 
means  by  which  to  test  the  interpersonal  justifiability  of  various  policy 
proposals given its thin requirement of ignorance regarding the individual’s 
situation within the dominant cooperative scheme.   
 
Yet  given  that  no  one  can  in  actuality  abstract  from  their  own  situated 
context, and so cannot accurately judge what is really justifiable to everyone, 
real-world interpersonal justification is necessary. Alexander Brown notes 
that politicians and other agents of public reasoning “don’t always start out 
with  reasonable  expectations  about  what  can  be  done  by  the  individual 
concerned”176 in a given policy proposal. It is for this reason that distributive 
justice must take into account the insights provided by recognition theorists 
regarding what it is reasonable to expect of diverse individuals in diverse 
social contexts. The specifics of the distributive scheme cannot and should 
not be written from the armchair. Brown proposes instead that we might 
establish, in the interest of justice and genuine interpersonal justifiability, 
citizens’  juries  as  means  by  which  to  approximate  “a  truly  public  test  of 
reasonableness.”177 Crucially, however, the individual representations made 
will only be admissible if they themselves can pass the test of interpersonal 
justifiability.  
 
Christian Schemmel claims that luck, resource and relational egalitarianism 
fundamentally flow from differing interpretations of the value of equality. 
Luck  egalitarianism  is  concerned  to  neutralize  the  impact  of  natural 
inequalities due to its focus on “the abstract moral equality of humans,” while 
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relational equality is more concerned with equality as founded in reciprocal 
cooperation.178 He points out that Dworkin’s ‘equal concern’, by contrast, is 
rooted in its being a requirement of the legitimacy of the state.179 Similarly 
Samuel Scheffler argues against resource egalitarianism being admitted to 
the class of relational egalitarian approaches sinc e  Dworkin  invokes  “the 
model of testator and heirs [which is] an asymmetrical model, with one party 
distributing benefits and the others receiving them. […] the model of testator 
and heir does not describe a relationship among equals at all.”180 This may 
indeed  be  an  unfortunate  choice  of  model  of  conceptualizing  distributive 
justice  for  our  conciliatory  purposes  here,  but  it  is  not  foundational  to 
Dworkin’s view. That particular example is most readily understood as an 
attempt  to  pump  our  intuitions  regarding  distributive  justice  from  an 
impartial perspective – of one who is not subject to the distributive scheme 
judged most just. When it comes to the actual determination of the principles 
of just distribution, I have been arguing, resource egalitarianism relies on the 
judgments  of  those  subject  to  those  principles  themselves  through  the 
hypothetical insurance device. In the same way, while Dworkin’s principles 
are grounded in the  ‘sovereign virtue’ of the  state’s equal concern  for all 
citizens, the state itself is nothing but the cooperative endeavour of those 
citizens. It is difficult, then, to see how resource egalitarianism’s concern for 
the legitimacy of the state and its policies can be understood as anything 
more than an alternative way of asking the relational egalitarian’s questions 
regarding reciprocal cooperation.  
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